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Job Security in a Recessionary Economy-Income Support or ReEmployment: Canada 1981-83
Abstract

In Canada, near full employment in the 1960s was followed by cyclical economic recessions throughout the
seventies, culminating in the severe recession of 1982. This led to employment and economic dislocation
among large sectors of the labour force. The disruption caused was compounded by the introduction of new
technology rendering existing worker skills redundant. The combined effect of these factors led to a large
increase in the number of lay-offs of both a temporary and permanent nature during the period from 1981 to
1983. Due to the extent of workforce reductions during that period and the fact that job loss causes not only
immediate financial hardship but is often accompanied by large social costs, protections against redundancy
and alleviation of the adverse effects of job loss have attracted increased attention in the employment setting.
Redundancy, temporary and permanent, has enormous social and economic ramifications affecting personal
legal rights and duties. Given the apparent conflict of interest which exists between the economics of
industrial competitiveness on the one hand and the employee's financial and psychological need for security
in employment on the other, the purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which this conflict has been
resolved by examining the legal and institutional protections available to employees facing redundancy in the
early 1980s The term "lay-off ' which is used throughout this article is conceptually imprecise. Usage of that
term is not confined to its often applied context which is a temporary suspension of the employment
relationship, but is used in a generic sense to cover lay-offs of both an indefinite and permanent nature
Consequently, in many parts of the text, the terms "redundancy" and “lay-off ” are used synonymously.
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JOB SECURITY IN A RECESSIONARY
ECONOMY - INCOME SUPPORT OR
RE-EMPLOYMENT: CANADA 1981-83
By JoHN IRVINE*
In Canada, nearfull employment in the 1960s was followed by cyclical economic
recessions throughout the seventies, culminating in the severe recession of 1982. This
led to employment and economic dislocationamong large sectors of the labourforce.
The disruption caused was compounded by the introduction of new technology
rendering existing worker skills redundant The combined effect of these factors led
to a large increase in the number of lay-offs of both a temporary and permanent
nature during the periodfrom 1981 to 1983.
Due to the extent of workforce reductions during that period and the fact that
job loss causes not only immediatefinancial hardship but is often accompanied by
largesocial costs,protectionsagainstredundancy and alleviationof the adverse effects
ofjob loss have attractedincreasedattention in the employment setting. Redundancy,
temporaryand permanen; has enormoussocial and economic ramificationsaffecting
personallegal rights and duties.
Given the apparent conflict of interest which exists between the economics of
industrial competitiveness on the one hand and the employee's financial and psychological need for security in employment on the other, the purpose of this article
is to examine the extent to which this conflict has been resolved by examining the
legal and institutionalprotections available to employees facing redundancy in the
early 1980s
The term "lay-off' which is used throughoutthis articleis conceptually impreci
Usage of that term is not confined to its often applied contex which is a temporary
suspension of the employment relationship, but is used in a generic sense to cover
lay-offs of both an indefinite and permanent nature Consequently, in many parts
of the tex the terms "redundancy"and "lay-off' are used synonymously.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The large increase in redundancies and lay-offs' which occurred
in Canada in the early 1980s focused considerable attention on the issue
of job security. Traditionally, in periods of adverse economic conditions,
1 In this paper the term 'lay-off" is used in a generic sense to cover both temporary and
permanent interruptions in employment due to the exercise of management prerogatives.
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employers resorted to lowering employee levels to reduce costs. Workforce
reductions, while necessary from the employer's perspective, not only
create immediate income difficulties for employees, but are often accompanied by psychological and physiological problems. The prolonged
economic recession of 1981-83 compounded many of those problems
and fuelled debate over the adequacy of legal and institutional protections
provided in a redundancy situation. This article examines those protections,
focusing attention on the difficulties faced by lower-level employees.
In the first section, reference is made to statistical sources to assess
the nature and extent of the redundancy problem from 1981 to 1983.
The second section is divided into two parts. First, the legal restrictions
imposed on the employer's right to lay-off under common law, collectivebargaining law, and labour standards legislation are examined. In the
second part, the available institutional protections are outlined. Emphasis
is placed upon the programmes designed to relieve economic hardship
caused by termination, to promote re-employment, and to create new
jobs.
In the third section, possible alternatives to lay-offs and redundancies
are discussed, principally work-sharing and early retirement policies.
Finally, in the concluding section, some suggestions are made in light
of the material discussed.
II. MEASUREMENT OF LAY-OFFS AND REDUNDANCIES IN
CANADA
Data on the extent of lay-offs and redundancies are available from
numerous national and provincial sources. At the national level, the most
comprehensive labour force coverage is provided by Statistics Canada
and the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission surveys. At
the provincial level, only Ontario and Quebec conduct surveys to measure
the extent of redundancies and lay-offs. None of these surveys provides
complete information on the redundancy problem.
A. Statistics Canada Data
The Statistics Canada Labour Force Survey conducts interviews in
about 56,000 representative households across the country and publishes
labour market data monthly. These data describe the situation of
unemployed persons before they were unemployed and divides them into
four groups: Job Losers, Job Leavers, Labour Force Re-Entrants, and
New Entrants to the Labour Force.
The Job Loser category is the most relevant in assessing the extent
of unemployment that may be attributed to workforce reductions. It is
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composed of unemployed persons who were involuntarily separated from
their last job. The figures include employees laid-off through lack of
work, illness, or as a result of physical disability; employees who have
been discharged for cause; and employees who have lost their jobs for
a variety of other reasons. Without an accurate breakdown of the actual
reasons for job loss, the figures might not provide particularly accurate
information in terms of the level of unemployment that may be attributed
to lay-offs for economic reasons. A recent Statistics Canada survey 2
emphasized, however, that while the Job Loser figures include employees
discharged for a variety of reasons, economic factors such as business
failure, decreased market demand, and technological change are by far
the most important.
The recorded data relating to unemployment indicate that in the
period from 1978 to 1981, job loss accounted for just under half of
the total unemployment figures each year.3 In 1982, job loss as a
percentage of the total national level of unemployment rose considerably. 4
The published data indicate that in 1982 the incidence of job loss was
higher among workers employed in goods-producing industries than in
the service industries, with mining, forestry, and manufacturing industries
being most affected. By occupation, job loss accounted for a higher
proportion of unemployment among blue-collar workers than among
white-collar workers. In blue-collar occupations,job loss was most marked
in manufacturing and construction. Regionally, the level of unemployment
due to job loss was highest in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island,
Quebec, New Brunswick, and British Columbia.
Although Job Loser figures do not provide scientifically accurate
data on the extent of unemployment for economic reasons alone, the
figures do indicate that the decline in levels of economic activity,
particularly in goods-producing industries, contributed significantly to
the large increase in the number of people who lost their jobs or were
laid-off in the period 1981-83.

2 Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey Division Research Section, Flows Into Unemployment
(Research Paper No. 17) by B. MacDonald (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, May 1978).
3 Job Loss as a Percentage of Total Unemployment
1978
48.4
1979
46.8
1980
48.3
1981
48.5
(Statistics Canada data).
4 By September, 1982, the figure had risen to 60.3 percent from 50.1 percent in January
1982. (Statistics Canada data).
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B. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission Data
The Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC)
publishes monthly information on all lay-offs of fifty or more workers
that have been brought to the attention of local Canada Employment
Centres, some 500 of which are situated throughout the country. The
published information includes the name of the firm involved, its location,
type of business performed, industry, actual number of workers laidoff, total workforce prior to lay-off, date of lay-off, reasons for layoff, and where applicable, date of recall.
Only employers within federal legislative jurisdiction are required
to notify the Commission of planned lay-offs and only then if the layoff involves fifty or more employees in any four-week period. Collection
of data on the number of employees laid-off within provincial jurisdiction
depends upon the efforts of Canada Employment Centre managers.
Reporting practices vary from one Canada Employment Centre to
another, as well as from one month to another, resulting in large monthly
fluctuations in reported lay-offs. It is to be expected that more difficulty
will be experienced in obtaining information on all lay-offs that occur
in larger cities where there may be a large number of undertakings than
in smaller centres with only one or two major industries. Consequently,
the coverage of actual lay-offs that have occurred is not complete, and
the published figures should not be totalled and used to represent the
number of workers laid-off in Canada in any given period. Despite this
limitation, the published data do provide a general picture of the nature
and extent of lay-offs in Canada, and a comparison of the figures published
over a particular period may indicate significant changes in lay-off
practices during that period.
The CEIC figures cover permanent, indefinite, and temporary layoffs. A permanent lay-off involves a complete severance of the employment relationship. An indefinite lay-off is generally one of undefined
duration lasting for more than thirteen weeks, while a temporary layoff is a suspension of the employment relationship for any period of
up to thirteen weeks in a twenty week period. The annual figures from
1978 to 1981 were as follows:
TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS LAID-OFF IN CANADA
(Includes Temporary, Permanent and Indefinite Lay-offs)
1978
75,158
1979
114,517
1980
193,042
1981
154,685
In the first ten months of 1982 there was a dramatic increase in the
number of recorded lay-offs with more than 271,000 employees being
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laid-off, over three times the total number of lay-offs recorded in 1978. 5
Of that figure, almost 78 percent occurred in Ontario and Quebec. 6 By
comparison, the Statistics Canada data referred to earlier indicated that
job loss as a percentage of levels of unemployment was highest in
Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, New Brunswick, and
British Columbia. The more industrialized provinces were particularly
badly affected, but because the CEIC data covers only lay-offs involving
fifty or more employees, many lay-offs occurring in the Atlantic provinces
may go unreported since employment there is often carried on in units
of fewer than fifty employees. The concentration of the published data
Table 1
Total Number of Persons Laid-off in Canada: January-October 1982
Temporary
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
Total
As a percentage
of the total

Indefinite
26,902
30,051
29,628
10,252
8,703
24,495
21,611
17,070
12,070
28,764
209,546

Permanent
6,416
5,173
6,253
6,797
4,815
4,482
3,376
2,996
5,663
5,144
51,115

77.3

18.9

Total
151
852
682
782
2,532
1,291
2,630
382
584
537
10,423

33,469
36,076
36,563
17,831
16,050
30,268
27,617
20,448
18,317
34,445
271,084

3.8

100

Source: Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Cat.
Table 2
Persons Laid-off by Province
Nfld.
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October*
Total

5 See Table 1.
6 See Table 2.

-

851
150
5,231
975
277
1,300
8,784

N.S.
171
193
1,080
520
1,567
117
14
72
94
3,828

N.B.
160
478
958
872
1,238
490
1,744
823
205
6,968

Que.
1,591
3,671
5,606
2,602
4,631
3,775
4,206
4,951
5,294
1,167
37,494

Ont.
31,567
28,538
24,298
12,715
6,402
10,017
10,591
8,313
10,207
30,100
172,748
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Table 2 (cont.)
Persons Laid-off by Province
Man.

Sask.

January

-

-

February
March
April
May

318
613
109
684

985
1,403
345
184

1,915
2,641
552
2,607

266

1,379

10,633

-

1,883
578
264
1,201
5,916

922
750
805
72
6,845

3,312
3,123
575
255
25,764

65
-

June

July
August
September
October*
Total
Percentage
of Reported
Layoffs

B.C.

P.E.I.

Alta.

-

151

68

278
82
1,393

800
-

-

133

2,553

Nfld. N.S.

N.B.

Que. Ont.

Man. Sask. B.C.

P.E.I. Alta.

3.2

2.5

13.8

2.2

-

1.4

63.7

2.5

9.5

1

* Yukon - 51 Layoffs

Source: Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Cat.

on lay-offs in Ontario and Quebec is perhaps also explained by more
strictly observed reporting practices.
Of the 271,084 lay-offs recorded in the period January to October
1982,97,535 lay-offs (35.9 percent) were directly related to the depressed
state of the automobile industry in Ontario and to a lesser extent in
Quebec. Poor market conditions in all of the provinces, accounted for
80,785 lay-offs (29.8 percent), while a lack of orders, mainly in Nova
Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, and the prairie provinces, accounted for 35,693
lay-offs (12.8 percent). A high inventory (24,980 lay-offs - 9.2 percent)
and declining sales (12,587 lay-offs - 4.6 percent) also influenced layoff practices in many of the provinces.
Plant closures were responsible for 7,718 lay-offs and accounted
for 2.8 percent of the recorded total.7 The main reasons necessitating
closure were financial difficulties and poor market conditions (70 percent).
Somewhat surprisingly, the lay-offs resulting from technological or
organizational change were rare. Only 1,334 lay-offs (0.5 percent) were
attributed to the introduction of new technology, perhaps because technological change may be introduced gradually over a period of time.
Where resulting lay-offs do not involve fifty or more employees within
a period of four weeks, they will not fall within the scope of the CEIC
survey and may not, therefore, be included in the published figures.

7 This represented 74 percent of the total of 19,423 permanent lay-offs that occurred between
January and October, 1982. (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission monthly data).
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The declining economic environment and the major structural
changes affecting certain industrial sectors, in particular the automobile,
textile, clothing, and footwear industries, appear to have been responsible
for the vast majority of lay-offs that occurred during the survey period.
C. ProvincialLay-off Statistics
In Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Alberta,
and British Columbia, data on the measurement and extent of lay-offs
are not kept by a provincial agency. In Newfoundland, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan, provincial lay-off statistics are based on information
provided by local Canada Employment Centres and only deal with layoffs involving fifty or more employees. The statistics are thus very similar
to the figures published by the CEIC.
The provincial labour ministries in Quebec and Ontario gather some
data on lay-offs as a result of the legal obligation imposed on employers
in those provinces to notify the ministries of large-scale lay-offs. In Quebec,
employers are required to notify the Ministry of Labour and Manpower
of all lay-offs involving ten or more employees. However, many layoffs go unreported, and consequently the published data do not indicate
the full extent of lay-offs in the province.
In Ontario, the Plant Closure Review and Employment Adjustment
Branch of the Ministry of Labour collects data on permanent and indefinite
lay-offs that occur in the province. Employers are required to notify
the Ministry of Labour of all permanent and indefinite lay-offs of fifty
or more employees occurring in any period of four weeks or less. The
Employment Adjustment Service also attempts to collect data on permanent and indefinite lay-offs involving twenty-five or more employees.
The extent of this information is limited and does not provide complete
coverage of lay-offs involving fewer than fifty employees.
The reported figures do not include any information on temporary
lay-offs, defined as a lay-off of thirteen weeks or less in any period
of twenty consecutive weeks. Furthermore, in those instances where
statutory exceptions deem lay-offs in excess of thirteen weeks to be
temporary lay-offs, there is no duty to inform the Ministry, and the layoffs will not be included in the statistics on permanent and indefinite
lay-offs.
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As in the case of both the Statistics Canada and the CEIC data,
the Ontario figures for 1982 show a significant increase in lay-offs over
8
those published in previous years.
D. Summary
Although data on redundancy and lay-off figures are available from
a number of sources in Canada, none of the studies provide complete
information on the nature and extent of the redundancy problem. The
Statistics Canada figures for Job Losers provide perhaps the most extensive
nation-wide coverage. The figures would be more useful, however, if
the category of Job Losers was broken down into specific groups based
on the reasons the job was lost. Information on the extent of job loss
due to workforce reductions could be obtained by including a question
in the household survey which required individuals to specify how they
came to lose their jobs.
The CEIC data provide very incomplete coverage of lay-offs. Although
information on temporary, permanent, and indefinite lay-offs is available,
this does not indicate the full extent of the problem since only employers
within the federal jurisdiction are required to report lay-offs and only
then if the lay-off involves fifty or more employees in any four week
period.
At the provincial level, there is a general absence of data on the
extent of lay-offs and redundancies. With the exception of Ontario and
Quebec, reliance is generally placed on information collected by Canada
Employment Centres for CEIC. As stated, this information is very
incomplete. In Ontario, while the data collected by the Ministry of Labour
is much more comprehensive than that collected by any of the other
provinces, the accuracy of this data as a measurement of redundancies
and lay-offs is also of limited use since information on temporary layoffs is not collected. Moreover, employers are required to notify the
Ministry of Labour of proposed lay-offs only when fifty or more employees
are to be laid-off in any four week period. While efforts are made to
gather information on lay-offs involving twenty-five to fifty employees,
the reporting of actual lay-offs occurring in this category is limited.

8 Total Number of Employees Affected by Indefinite or Permanent Layoffs in Ontario:
1977-78
17,052

1978-79
1979-80
1980-81
1981-82(Nov.)

10,559
21,636
25,869
42,857

This information was provided by the Plant Closure Review and Adjustment Branch of the Ontario
Ministry of Labour.
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It has not been possible to obtain an accurate figure for the number
of workers who were laid-off, either temporarily or permanently, during
the survey period because of the reporting practices outlined. Clearly,
however, the problem was one of growing proportions in 1981-83.
Although increased demand for labour in energy-related sectors was
anticipated, the manufacturing industry, upon which a number of the
provinces depended heavily, was facing increased foreign competition.
This was particularly strong in labour-intensive standard technology
sectors where developing countries were concentrating their efforts to
increase industrialization and raise export volumes.
Ontario and Quebec, the largest and most industrialized provinces,
appeared to bear the brunt of this competition since labour displacement
was most marked in import-competing domestic sectors of the economy,
such as the automobile and textile industries. Both large and small-scale
lay-offs that occurred in vulnerable branches of industry were therefore
expected to continue, at least in the short term. Given this fact, the
inadequacy of available data raised a number of issues. Perhaps most
important is the extent to which the lack of comprehensive data may
have hindered labour market adjustment measures that were designed
to help employees who had been laid-off. This issue will be particularly
relevant to subsequent sections of this paper.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal protections governing termination of employment in
Canada are derived from three main sources: the common law, collectivebargaining law, and labour legislation. Each will now be considered.
A. Restrictions Upon Lay-offs Under Common Law
Under the common law, it is generally recognized that an employee
may not be laid off, temporarily or permanently, without being given
reasonable notice, even where a lay-off is necessary for economic or
financial reasons. Business exigencies do not relieve the employer of
the obligation to give due notice unless the contract of employment
expressly or impliedly allows for summary dismissal or temporary
suspension of the employment relationship as a result of lack of work.9
In such cases, the employer may dismiss an employee by providing proper
notice of dismissal or, alternatively, by paying the employee the wages
or salary he or she would have earned during the notice period.

9 Gillespie v. Bulkley Valley ForestIndusres Ltd (1973), 39 D.L.R. (3d) 586 (B.C.S.C.).
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The issue of what may or may not be deemed reasonable notice
will depend upon individual cases.' 0 The impact of prevailing market
conditions on employment opportunities has had a significant bearing
on the length of notice required by the judiciary. Recent case-law
emphasizes the availability of similar alternative employment opportunities as an important factor to be considered in assessing notice
entitlement.1
Advance notice of termination is intended to facilitate job search
and help the employee organize his or her personal affairs prior to the
actual date of dismissal. Accordingly, the period of reasonable notice
has a direct bearing on labour mobility by providing an opportunity to
secure re-employment before being affected by a drop in income. In
pursuing this objective, the judiciary in Canada have been quite generous
to employees, quite frequently providing for periods of notice of up to
one year.' 2 For the most part, however, the determination of an appropriate
notice period has been influenced by the employee's previous qualifications, experience, training, and by the nature and importance of the
job function performed. In the case of managerial-level employees of
moderate seniority, a presumption has emerged that at least one year's
notice of termination be given. 3 For lower-level employees, it would
appear that one to two months notice would be the exception rather
than the rule.14 Clearly, therefore, one of the major obstacles preventing
lower-level employees from receiving adequate protection has been
judicial interpretation of the concept of reasonable notice rather than
the concept itself. Other factors have also restricted the impact of the
common law. Many lower-level employees are unaware of their rights
at common law, and this has prevented reliance on the court system
to enforce the notice requirement. Even where employees are aware of
these rights, the uncertainty surrounding the concept of reasonable notice
coupled with the cost of bringing an action has discouraged litigation.

10 Bardal v. The Globe & Mail Ltd (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 140 at 145 (Ont. H.C.).
I1 Munana v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd (1977), [1977] 2 A.C.W.S. 364 (B.C.S.C.).

12 Campbell v. Business Fleets Ltd (1954), [1954] 2 D.L.R. 263 (Ont. C.A.); cf Johnston v.
Northwood Pulp Ltd (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 15 (Ont. H.C.).
13 See D. Harris, Wrongful Dismissal 2d ed. (Don Mills: R. DeBoo, 1980) at 71-77. Cf Burton
v. MacMillan Bloedel Ltd (1976), [1976] 4 W.W.R. 267 (B.C.S.C.) - 15 months notice required;
Douglasv.Sandwelland Co. (1978), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 508 (B.C.S.C.) - 21 months notice was awarded.
Cf I. Christie, Employment Law in Canada(Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 350.
14 See RJ. Harrison, "Termination of Employment" (1972) 10 Alta. L. Rev. 250 at 265,
where he suggests that the courts have placed too much emphasis on the grade and character
of employment in assessing notice entitlement.
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For this reason, the case law has almost exclusively featured managerial
and executive-level plaintiffs.1 5
B. Restrictions Upon Lay-offs Under Collective BargainingLaw
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the common
law remained the primary source of employment rights and duties in
Canada. The law of contract applied in the employment setting demonstrated clear inadequacies, however, and led to the growth of trade
unions and legislative encouragement of a system of free collective
bargaining. In the last fifty years, the impact of the common law has
been reduced considerably by the emergence of a legislated collectivebargaining system.
Currently, slightly more than half of the Canadian workforce is
covered by collective agreements negotiated by trade unions. For these
employees, collective bargaining has had a significant impact in improving
their terms and conditions of employment, particularly in relation to the
employer's right to terminate employment. The abstraction of contract
law under which all employment rights and duties may be reduced to
a period of notice or pay in lieu of notice provides little protection to
the employee. As a result, the vast majority of collective agreements
now contain a clause requiring the employer to show cause for dismissal.
This prevents the employer from terminating employment merely by
providing a period of reasonable notice.
Through the development of the 'just cause' concept in collective
agreements, the collective bargaining system appears to have provided
an element of security in employment not present under the ordinary
law of contract applied at common law. Yet, this element of security
must not be over emphasized. While, on one hand, cause for dismissal
must be shown under the grievance arbitration process, on the other
hand, employee rights may be frustrated by bona fide business considerations necessitating lay-offs of either a temporary or permanent nature.
During economic downturns and periods of decreased market demand,
employers have traditionally relied upon reductions in employment levels
as a cost-reducing measure. A temporary lay-off involving suspension,
on the employer's initiative, of the employee's obligation to work and
the employer's obligation to pay is itself largely a creation of the collective
bargaining system and is not normally recognized at common law.
Permanent lay-offs, on the other hand, involve a complete severance
of the employment relationship, and are normally relied upon where
15 K Swinton, "Contract Law and the Employment Relationship: The Proper Forum for Reform"
in B. Reiter & J. Swan, eds., Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1980) at 365.
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technological developments, a departmental re-organization, or a plant
closure have rendered all or part of the workforce superfluous.
When temporary or permanent lay-offs are instituted, considerable
controversy arises between the employer's attempts to secure optimum
economic efficiency and the employee's right to some degree of employment security. This conflict of values created severely strained
union-management relations in the period 1981-83 as the number of
lay-offs steadily increased.
1. The impact of collective bargaining on the employer's right to layoff
The employer's 'right to manage' not only requires that the cost
of labour be a variable factor (thus ensuring prompt response to economic
change) but provides a justification for lay-offs and redundancies. The
assessment of the effect of lay-offs, as of other social and economic
phenomena, is primarily a question of values. The process of industrial
mutation, euphemistically known as progress or advancement, is essential
to individual enterprises and to society in general. Concentration on the
benefits of industrial change, however, ignores many of the attendant
social and economic costs that change generates, particularly for the
individual employee for whom redundancy often means hardship and
insecurity.
In Canada, a large majority of collective agreements include a
'management rights' clause which reserves for management the right
to operate the enterprise, contract out work, assign work within the
bargaining unit, determine work methods, and direct the workplace
generally. Even without an explicit 'management rights' provision, it is
generally accepted by arbitrators that these functions, as the essence of
management, properly belong to the employer, if only on the basis of
economic logic. Thus, limitations upon the managerial prerogative to
control the use of labour must be expressly bargained for during the
negotiation of a collective agreement. Traditionally, management has
resisted any encroachment into these decision-making rights, including
the right to lay-off. It regards union incursion as a serious abridgement
of its established authority. Consequently, only through hard bargaining
have concessions been achieved by trade union negotiations. This has
considerably circumscribed trade union influence in the traditional areas
of management discretion.
From the outset, trade union representatives concentrated their efforts
on achieving immediate tangible benefits for their members, such as
improved wage and overtime rates and vacation pay. As a result, less
emphasis was placed on long-term security in employment and the
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imposition of restrictions on management's right to lay-off, contract out
or assign work, introduce new technology, or close down operations
entirely. During the industrial growth of the 1960s, these goals may have
seemed less important, but now the preservation of employment has
become perhaps the most critical job concern of the employee.
Employment protection, however, must be bargained for, and in this
process unions may be required to make concessions on other issues.
Until now, trade unions have been reluctant to make such concessions
in return for greater job security. Rather than attempting to prevent layoffs, union negotiators have concentrated on cushioning their impact by
achieving the best possible terms available in the situation. It has been
suggested that the principal reason trade unions have failed to negotiate
more effective restrictions on the employer's right to lay-off is the relative
bargaining power of the parties.' 6 In many cases, an inequality of
bargaining power has precluded bargaining on such issues and has
contributed to the dearth of collective-dismissal clauses in collective
agreements.
The essence of bargaining power lies in the ability to withhold
something of value from the other party. Even organized employees have
little inherent bargaining power, however, and often can only gain
concessions through inflicting economic costs on management by strike
action. The difficulty with bargaining over issues of job security is that
accurate information on the long-term plans of the enterprise is often
not available, and, during the negotiations period, plans for change may
not have emerged. As a result, trade unions may often have problems
gaining support for the imposition of economic sanctions as a response
to job security issues that may only arise many years hence. When union
negotiators consider the possible adverse publicity associated with striking
over issues that may not even materialize, job security may be tradedoff to gain more immediate financial benefits. Additional reasons for
concentrating on short-term benefits may include the fact that, in the
past, lay-offs have not been perceived as a major problem by trade unions
in Canada,17 the possibility of government intervention in the form of
unemployment insurance, manpower services, and re-training programmes has been regarded as an adequate solution to the problem.

16 D. Beatty, "Ideology, Politics and Unionism" in K.P. Swan &
K. Swinton, eds., Studies in Labour Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983) 299.
17 Report ofthe Commission ofInquiry into RedundanciesandLay-offs (Ottawa: Labour Canada,
March 1979) (Chair- A.W.R. Carrothers) [hereinafter Carrothers].
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2. Negotiated provisions related to lay-offs
In spite of difficulties such as those cited above, the collective
bargaining process has produced restrictions on the employer's right to
lay-off. An analysis of the terms of the 2,205 collective agreements on
file with Labour Canada in April 1982,18 covering some 2.4 million
public and private sector employees in enterprises involving two hundred
workers or more, indicates that these agreements left the employer
relatively free to decide whether to call a lay-off, but restricted the choice
of who was to be laid-off. The data show that advance notice of layoffs not attributable to technological change was provided for in 1,231
agreements (55.8 percent) covering 54.1 percent of the 2,444,976
employees affected. Of these 1,231 agreements, 822 (66.7 percent),
covering 32.1 percent of the employees who fell within their scope,
provided for notice of ten days or less.
Table 3
Content of Collective Agreements
Agreements
No.

%

Workers
No.

%

2,205
974
568
254
31
62
64
39
41
15
30
53
74

100.0
44.2
25.8
11.5
1.4
2.8
2.9
1.8
1.9
0.7
1.4
2.4
3.4

2,444,976
1,122,035
525,316
259,915
74,045
116,960
76,235
35,205
47,505
13,775
46,280
47,420
80,285

100.0
45.9
21.5
10.6
3.0
4.8
3.1
1.4
1.9
0.6
1.9
1.9
3.3

Distributionof Work DuringSlack Periods
2,205
Total
2,065
No Provision
140
Provision Exists

100.0
93.6
6.4

2,444,976
2,317,451
127,525

100.0
94.7
5.3

Bumping Rights
Total
No Provision
Unrestricted Right
Restricted Right

100.0
52.7
13.1
34.2

2,444,976
1,370,014
259,345
815,617

100.0
56.0
10.6
33.4

Notice of Lay-off
Total
No Provision
5 days or less
6-10 days
11-15 days
16-20 days
21-25 days
26-30 days
31-40 days
41-60 days
61 or more days
Graduated
Other

2,205
1,161
288
756

18 Provisionsin Collective Agreements in Canada Covering 200 and More Employees (Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services, April 1982) at 18-20, 22, 17, 144-45, 147, 150, 154, 146, 15253.
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Table 3 (cont.)
Technological Change
Agreements
Workers
No.
%
No.
Advance Notice andlor Consultation with Employees andlor Trade Union Prior
to the Introduction of Technological Changes
Total
2,205
100.0
2,444,976
No Provision
1,542
69.9
1,491,428
Less than 3 months
158
7.2
188,076
3-6 months
262
11.9
453,955
6-12 months
18
0.8
58,675
12 months or more
5
0.2
5,470
Other
220
10.0
247,372
Notice of Lay-off
Total
2,205
100.0
2,444,976
No Provision
1,990
90.2
2,218,066
Less than 3 months
81
3.7
108,265
3-6 months
87
3.9
82,645
Other
47
2.1
36,000
Labour-ManagementCommittee on Technological Change
Total
2,205
100.0
2,444,976
No Provisions
1,978
89.7
1,939,243
Committee Studies Problem
209
9.5
493,153
Committee Administers
Funds Programs
9
0.4
5,825
Committee Studies Problems and
Administers Funds/Programs
9
0.4
6,755
Re-opener Clause
Total
2,205
100.0
2,444,976
No Provision
2,150
97.5
2,368,116
Wage Re-opener
40
1.8
41,395
Working Conditions Re-Opener
6
0.3
30,725
Wages and Working Conditions
9
0.4
4,740
Training or Re-Training
Total
2,205
100.0
2,444,976
No Provision
1,726
78.3
1,766,476
Training on New Equipment
246
11.2
343,395
Training for Another Job
154
7.0
216,370
Other
79
3.6
118,735
Contracting Out
Agreements
Workers
No.
%
No.
Total
2,205
100.0
2,444,976
No Provision
1,332
60.4
1,241,034
Permitted
316
14.3
480,882
Prohibited
31
1.4
15,430
Prohibited if Leads to Lay-off
479
21.7
661,680
Prohibited if to
Non-Union Employer
26
1.2
26,805
Prohibited if Leads to Lay-off
and if to a Non-Union Employer
13
0.6
14,585
Other
8
0.4
4,560

%
100.0
61.0
7.7
18.6
2.4
0.2
10.1
100.0
90.7
4.4
3.4
1.5
100.0
79.3
20.2
0.2
0.3
100.0
96.9
1.7
1.3
0.2
100.0
72.2
14.0
8.8
4.9

%
100.0
50.8
19.7
0.6
27.1
1.1
0.6
0.2

Source: Provisionsin Collective Agreements in Canada Covering 200 and More Employees (Ottawa:

Ministry of Supply and Services, April 1982) at 18-20,22, 17, 144-45, 150, 147, 154, 146,152-53.
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A distribution of work during slack periods to prevent or minimize
lay-offs was provided in only 140 agreements (6.4 percent) affecting
5.3 percent of workers. Wage or employment guarantees were provided
in only 10.1 percent of the agreements covering 14.4 percent of employees.
Provisions governing additional monetary protection such as supplementary unemployment benefits, severance pay, and guaranteed earnings did
not provide significantly greater protection.19
Table 4
Income Provisions on Lay-Off
Agreements
No.
%
Severance Pay and Supplementary Unemployment Benefit
Total
2,205
100.0
59.0
No Provision
1,3.00
7'36
Severance Pay Plan
33.4
Servance Pay and Supplementary
Unemployment Benefits
62
2.8
Supplementary Unemployment
Benefits
107
4.9
GuaranteedEmployment or Earnings
Total
No Provision
More than 1 day but less
than 1 week
On a weekly basis
On a monthly basis
On an annual basis
On a seasonal basis
Other

2,205
1,981
72
69
14
45
3
21

100.0
89.8

Workers
No.
2,444,976

100.0

950,414
1,109,637

38.9
45.4

179,380

73.0

205,545

8.4

2,444,976
2,092,859

100.0
85.6

179,520
44,217
24,690
82,035
5,500
16,155

Source: Provisions in Collective Agreements in Canada Covering 200 and More Employees (Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services, April 1982) at 23, 68-69.

The most common form of protection against lay-off and redundancy
secured through collective bargaining is that of seniority. Labour Canada
data from 1982 dealing with both the role of seniority in determining
who was to be laid-off and the retention of seniority during lay-off is
20
shown below in Table Five.

19 See Table 4.
20 See Table 5.
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Table 5
Seniority Provisions on Lay-Off
Agreements
No.

%

Workers
No.

%

2,205
364
324
846

100.0
16.5
14.7
38.4

2,444,976
623,196
382,378
937,522

100.0
'25.5
15.7
38.3

671

30.4

502,060

20.5

Retention of Seniority DuringLay-Off
Total
2,205
No Provision
541
Up to 6 months
199
6-12 months
594
12-18 months
140
18-24 months
337
Over 24 months
179
Graduated by Length of Service
135
Not Specified
72
Other
8

100.0
24.5
9.0
26.9
6.3
15.3
8.1
6.1
3.3
0.4

2,444,976
805,136
170,955
557,805
131,305
372,590
208,875
91,695
95,465
11,150

100.0
32.9
7.0
22.8
5.4
15.2
8.5
3.8
3.9
0.5

Seniority on Lay-off
Total
No Provision
Straight Seniority
Seniority and Other Factors
Straight Seniority if the
Other Factors are Equal

Source: Provisions in Collective Agreements in Canada Covering 200 or More Employees (Ottawa:

Ministry of Supply and Services, April 1982) at 12, 13-14.

The basic principle of seniority is that employees who have worked
for a company for a long period of time are more deserving of company
benefits than are employees who have been with the company for a
shorter period. It is most often of importance in promotion, transfer,
lay-off, and recall decisions, providing a rudimentary property right in
employment. Regarding seniority and lay-off, it has been stated that,
[m]ore than any other provision of the collective agreement ... seniority affects
the economic security of the individual employee covered by its terms. In industries
characterized by a steady reduction in total employment, the employee's length
of service is his principal protection against the loss of his job. In cases of mass
lay-offs, his chances of being retained or recalled will very likely depend upon
such factors as the basis for determining seniority preference (e.g. plants, departmental, or crafts) ... and the extent to which 'bumping' is permitted. 2'

The greater the emphasis placed on seniority alone, without attempting to consider merit, skill, ability, and qualifications, the greater the
restriction on management decision-making rights. Collective agreements,
including non-competitive seniority promotion and lay-off clauses, had
actually increased slightly in numbers in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 22
21 B. Aaron, "Reflections On The Legal Nature And Enforceability Of Seniority Rights" (1962)
75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 at 1535.
22 W.D. Wood & P. Kumar, The CurrentIndustrialRelations Scene In Canada:1980 (Kingston:
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, July 1980) at 391.

1986]

Job Security in a Recessionary Economy

In almost 40 percent of the agreements covered by the Labour Canada
data, seniority rights were reinforced by 'bumping' provisions which allow
a senior employee who is being laid-off to displace a morejunior employee,
provided the senior employee can perform the relevant tasks. Bumping
rights may be restricted to the job classification, the department, or the
plant in which the senior employee works, depending on the wording
of the agreement.
While the application of the criterion of length of service remains
the most common means of curbing management arbitrariness, the danger
is that as departmental seniority systems 'wall-off specific plant sections,
resistance to change affecting any of these sections is heightened. This
in turn accentuates conflict between management rights and employee
job security demands.
3. Technological change resulting in lay-offs and redundancies
Many trade union negotiators have attempted to bargain for protection against lay-offs due to technological change. The difficulty they
face is that changes occur very infrequently and bargaining in advance
requires a long-sighted negotiation policy. Nevertheless, protections were
increasingly bargained for by the early 1980s. 23 Clauses included in the
collective agreement generally required advance notice of the introduction
of new technology and accompanying lay-offs, possibly coupled with
a duty to consult and, in a number of cases, a provision requiring a
re-opening of the agreement for renegotiation. This latter form of
protection was quite rare and it appears that clauses of this nature were
declining.24
23 Ibid at 388 for the relevant figures for March 1980. Compare with the figures for October
1980 in W.D. Wood & P. Kumar, The CurrentIndustrialRelations Scene in Canada:1981 (Kingston:

Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, July 1981) at 345.
24 The table below shows the collective agreement provisions for all industries across Canada

employing 500 or more employees, excluding construction, that have technological change reopener
clauses.
%

Workers
No.

%

844
12
832

100.0
1.4
98.6

1,705,000
21,600
1,683,400

100.0
1.3
98.7

Total
Provision

1,028
2

100.0
0.2

2,114,100
3,100

100.0
0.2

No Provision

1,026

99.8

2,110,900

99.8

Agreements
No.
October 1973
Total
Provision
No Provision

October 1980

Source: Wood & Kumar, supra,note 22 at 334.
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Table 6
Employment Security
Agreements

Workers
No.

%

No.

%

2,205
1,824
363

100.0
82.7
16.5

2,444,976
1,898,216
514,685

100.0
77.6
21.1

Attrition

4

0.2

1,825

0.1

Distribution of Work
Employment Guarantee or
Attrition or Distribution of Work
Other

2

0.1

1,180

0.0

8
4

0.4
0.2

27,315
1,755

1.1
0.1

Employment Security (Technological Change)

Total
No Provision
Wage or Employment Guarantee

Source: Provisons in Collective Agreements in Canada Covering 200 and More Employees (Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services, April 1982) at 148-49.

Labour Canada data indicate that advance notice of technological
change, or consultation with employees or the trade union prior to the
introduction of new technology, was required in only 663 agreements
(30 percent) covering some 953,548 employees (40 percent). Notice of
lay-off due to technological change was required in only 215 agreements
(9.7 percent) covering 226,910 (9.2 percent) of the 2,444,976 employees
affected. In 37.6 percent of those agreements covering 47.7 percent of
employees entitled to advance notice, the period of notice was less than
three months.
Ajoint labour-management technological change committee to study
the problems created or administer funds and programmes to combat
these problems was required in only 227 agreements (10.3 percent)
covering some 505,733 employees (20.7 percent). 'Reopener' clauses to
facilitate renegotiation of the terms and conditions of employment were
provided in only 2.5 percent of the agreements covering 78,860 employees
(3.2 percent). Employment security guarantees were included in less than
17 percent of agreements covering 23 percent of workers.25 In cases
where lay-offs actually occur the employee may require retraining to
return to the work-force. Labour Canada figures show that retraining
provisions were included in 479 agreements (21.7 percent) covering some
678,500 employees (27.7 percent).
The available data indicates collective bargaining's limited impact
in imposing restrictions on the employer's right to lay-off in Canada.
Few of the agreements contained clauses that were intended to prevent
or minimize lay-offs from the outset, the most widespread form of
protection being provided by the requirement that seniority be recognized
25 See Table 6.
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when the choice of those to be laid off was being made. The vast majority
of the collective agreements considered seem to accept the economic
justification for redundancies and lay-offs and to this extent provide mainly
economic buffers to alleviate the hardships arising from the drop in real
income that almost invariably accompanies job loss.
Due to the failure to secure effective protections through the collective
bargaining process, a number of legislatures have enacted technological
change provisions in their respective Labour Codes. These provisions
require adequate notice of change to be given to the employees and
permit collective agreements to be reopened in mid-term for renegotiation.26 Part V of the Canada Labour Code contains provisions to this

effect. 27 Employers wishing to effect technological change which is likely
to affect a significant number of employees are required by section 150(1)
to notify the employee's bargaining agent at least ninety days before
the change is scheduled to take place. The bargaining agent must seek
permission (section 152) from the Canada Labour Relations Board to
renegotiate for the purpose of revising the existing provisions of the
collective agreement or to draft new provisions to assist employees
affected. The proposed changes are stayed until the Board either grants
or refuses permission to renegotiate. The legislation does not, however,
provide the affected employees with an outright veto on technological
change. The employer may proceed with the proposed changes as soon
as there has been compliance with the relevant procedures under sections
150 and 152.
The reopener provisions were intended to enhance the opportunities
for union negotiators to influence technological change decisions. However, from 1973, when the legislation became effective, until the beginning
of 1982, the Canada Labour Relations Board received only eleven
applications to reopen collective agreements and none were accepted
for formal hearing. In 1982 the provisions of the Code were reviewed
28
for the first -time, almost ten years after they had become effective.
The Board undertook an extensive review of the reasons for the enactment
of the relevant sections. Significantly, a number of the sources referred
to suggested that the reason why so few cases had been brought under
Part V of the Code was the fact that many of the collective agreements
subject to the provisions of the Canada Labour Code contained escape
clauses. These clauses provided, in accordance with the legislation, that

26 Labour Relations Act, S.M. 1972, c. 75, ss 72-75. Trade Union Act 1972, S.S. 1972, c.
137, s. 42.

27 CanadaLabour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L.-1, ss 149-53 as am. S.C. 1972, c. 18, s. 1.
28 Ottawa-CarletonRegional Transit Commission and A.T U Local 1502 and Ottawa-Carleton
Regional Transit Commission and A.T.U. Local 279 (1981), [1982] 1 C.L.R.B.R. 172.
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there would be no recourse to the Board where the agreement contained
specific provisions governing the effect of technological change.
In those jurisdictions that have not introduced similar requirements,
the prohibition on strike action during the currency of the collective
agreement prevents recourse to measure of self-help. In Ontario, for
example, section 42 of the LabourRelations Act provides,
(1) Every collective agreement shall provide that there will be no
strikes or lock-outs so long as the agreement continues to operate.
(2) If a collective agreement does not contain such a provision as
is mentioned in sub-section (1) it shall be deemed to contain
the following provision: "There shall be no strikes or lock-outs
29
so long as this agreement continues to operate."
This prohibition appears to assume that the collective agreement
provides an exhaustive charter of agreed terms and conditions. In fact,
various issues, including technological change, may have been raised
at the bargaining table and then dropped when management asserted
that it did not have any immediate plans pertaining to those issues. Where
technological change resulting in lay-off subsequently occurs, the absolute
prohibition on strike action is substantially unfair. Moreover, if the
agreement is silent on the issue of technological change, then recourse
to grievance arbitration by employees facing lay-off would likely prove
ineffective, given the reluctance of arbitrators to add to the terms of
the collective agreement.
Proponents of the adversarial collective bargaining system argue
that it gives rise to a dichotomy of function. Management acts as initiator
in introducing change and trade unions reserve a right of appeal through
the arbitration process. What proponents of the system fail to take into
account, however, is that there can be no right of appeal against employer
action in areas not covered by the collective agreement. Arguably,
therefore, the mandatory no-strike clause should not be an absolute bar
to industrial actions during the currency of a collective agreement.
In the British Columbia Labour Code,30 provision is made for the
reopening of the agreement and recourse to strike action is made available.
However, reliance is not placed on the latter. Instead, the real response
to the problem is evidenced by a statutory requirement that the parties
negotiate a contract clause dealing with the issue of technological change.
If the parties fail to produce an adequate clause themselves, the Minister
of Labour can intervene and impose one. This form of compulsory interest
arbitration on the issue of technological change underscores the more
29 LabourRelations Act, S.O. 1980, c. 228, s. 42.
30 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, ss 74-78.
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general sentiments held by Canadian legislators against mid-contract work
stoppages.
While legislative reform in the area of technological change does
provide a measure of additional protection of employees, it does not
address the more general criticism that all the disputes and dissatisfactions
that might arise during the term of a collective agreement cannot be
provided for in advance. The inclusion of a clause permitting trade unions
to proceed to arbitration over disputes relating to the terms of the collective
agreement has been proclaimed as the quidproquo for a clause forbidding
strikes during the agreement's currency. Since the collective agreement
does not provide an exhaustive charter of rights, it is apparent that the
commitments of management and labour are not coextensive. It may
be said, therefore, that the 'no-strike' provisions of labour relations
legislation in most Canadian jurisdictions constitute something considerably in excess of the agreement to arbitrate.
4. Summary
The requirement that an employer have cause in order to discharge
an employee is a significant improvement on the common-law position
of virtually unlimited exposure to termination. The measure of additional
protection that this requirement provides, and the extensive remedial
powers acquired by grievance arbitrators, have considerably improved
the employee's position. However, given the employer's right to terminate
for economic reasons, the rights of individual employees have obviously
been subordinated to the goal of economic efficiency. The Labour Canada
figures outlined above indicate that apart from seniority requirements,
the collective bargaining process had a limited impact on the entire
question of workforce reductions arising from lay-offs or redundancies
in the early 1980s. Lay-off problems and processes can be brought to
the bargaining table but the practice is not extensive in Canada. Even
where such issues were raised in the past, they appear to have been
traded off for more immediate financial benefits such as increased wage
and overtime rates.
The whole issue of a 'management rights' philosophy goes beyond
the four comers of a collective agreement, and, in circumstances of
material change, currently claimed prerogatives may be impeding socially
satisfactory and rational manpower adjustments. Generally speaking,
employers' commitments to the social and economic well-being of their
employees are less than their commitments to business efficiency. Because
job rights are negotiated in collective agreements, the right to employment
security is also deemed to be a bargainable issue. There are practical
limitations to securing acceptable levels of employment security through
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collective bargaining. These include the low priority given to this issue
in the past by trade union negotiators, difficulties in obtaining information
about potential changes, hard bargaining by management, and the lowtrust relationships that exist between management and unions.
Fundamental to the question of bargaining for protection in employment is the fact that the collective bargaining system as it currently
operates is far from comprehensive in its coverage of the labour force
or in its coverage of subject matter.31 Regarding the latter, it has been
suggested that the touchstone of a system of collective bargaining is
the move from an autocratic, contractual system to a participatory
decision-making process. Free collective bargaining is said to advance
a pluralistic social conception which excludes the traditional a priori
property justification for unilateral decision-making by management. To
the extent that it is deemed to permit an employee to participate in
the establishment of rules governing the working environment, collective
32
bargaining is analogized to citizen participation in the political arena.
In the vast majority of cases, however, the subject matter dealt with
in collective agreements is restricted. The analogy drawn with rights
of political citizenship may not, therefore, be particularly appropriate.
A number of commentaries argued that the major factor preventing
the emergence of a truly participatory system of decision making is a
lack of bargaining power. While this is undoubtedly true in many sectors
of industry, it is not the only relevant factor. Collective bargaining in
Canada is based largely on a structure composed of single-employer,
single-location bargaining units. Consequently, collective agreements are
of local application only and may not extend sufficiently far to deal
with major corporate initiatives, in particular those dealing with technological change and plant closures. Moreover, the scope of subject matter
has seldom ranged beyond the issues of immediate tangible benefit into
the areas of managerial direction of the enterprise.
Hence, there are limitations on the role that collective bargaining
can play in ensuring protection of employee interests in critical areas
such as incumbency in employment. Indeed, lay-offs may occur more
frequently in unionized sectors where the low-trust relationship that the
adversary system perpetuates may cause a reluctance to accept downward
adjustments in wage rates.33 At the height of the economic recession
of the early 1980s, the collective bargaining system in Canada was
31 In 1981 in Canada, 39 percent of non-agricultural workers were unionized. See Wood
& Kumar, The Current IndustrialRelations Scene in Canada: 1981, supra,note 23 at 220.
32 See Beatty, supra, note 16 at 320-24.
33 J.L. Medoff, "Layoffs and Alternatives under Trade Unions in U.S. Manufacturing" (1979)
69 American Econ. A. 380.
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ineffective as an instrument for employees to make their views on job
security issues known. It provided neither an effective method of participating in the discussion of such issues, nor a means of exercising
34
control over the resolution of problems arising from the issues.
C. Lay-offs and Minimum StandardsLegislation
The requirement that all disputes arising out of the terms of collective
agreements be submitted to a process of compulsory binding arbitration
for resolution has greatly reduced the influence of the courts on employees
falling within the collective bargaining system. However, almost half of
the Canadian workforce is not covered by collective agreements. For
many workers in the marginal labour force, collective bargaining is not
a realistic possibility, due primarily to problems of organization. Recognition of this, coupled with the fact that the subject matter dealt with
in most collective agreements is not always comprehensive enough, has
prompted legislative intervention to provide minimum standards for terms
and conditions of employment of both organized and unorganized
employees. In the last fifteen years, the development and expansion of
employment rights under legislative aegis has superceded total reliance
upon contractual or collectively bargained agreements. The regulation
of the employment relationship through statutory intervention has reached
such an extent that it has been suggested that the creation of a minimum
level of employment rights and duties in this manner has led to the
"retreat of Canadians from contractual freedom to the more secure
advantages of status." 35
Among the most significant developments along this line have been
the restrictions imposed on the employer's right to terminate the employment relationship. In several jurisdictions, legislation has provided
unorganized employees some protection against arbitrary discharge. More
widespread, however, has been the protection provided against job loss
for economic reasons. The ineffectiveness of the common-law notice
requirement for lower-level employees and the lack of protection provided
against economically motivated terminations under collective agreements
have led almost all Canadian legislatures to specify a minimum period
of written notice prior to termination. Moreover, a number of these
jurisdictions require extended notice periods where a larger group of
employees is affected, whether or not a collective agreement applies.3 6
34 See Beatty, supra, note 16 at 325-38.

35 H. Arthurs, "Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada's Second Century"
(1967) 45 Can. B. Rev. 786 at 787.
36 See Table 7.
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In Ontario and the federal jurisdiction, severance pay provisions have
also been enacted. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the provisions found
in minimum standards legislation usually exceed the protections provided
in collective agreements, and in some cases provide a higher level of
protection than that provided by the common law.
Table 7
Individual Notice Requirements (1982)
Jurisdiction

Notice Required

Coverage of the Scheme

Federal

2 Weeks

Employees employed in federal
work or under-taking who have
been employed for more than
3 months.

Alberta

Employees with more than
3 months' but less than 2 years'
service are entitled to 7 days'
notice. Employees employed for
2 years or more are entitled to
14 days' notice.

All employees with more than
3 months' service except those
employed in the construction
industry.

British Columbia Employees with more than

All employees with more than
6 months' but less than 2 years'
6 months' service.
service are entitled to 2 weeks'
notice. If employed for more than
2 years, employees are entitled to
2 weeks' notice plus 1 week's
notice for each additional year of
employment up to a maximum of
8 weeks' notice.

Manitoba

A period of notice equivalent to
the normal pay period.

All employees employed for
more than 2 weeks, except farm
workersll.

Newfoundland

Employees employed for more
than 1 month but less than
2 years are entitled to 1 week's
notice. Employees employed for
more than 2 years are entitled to
2 weeks' notice.

All employees employed for
more than I month, except those
employed in the construction
industry.

Nova Scotia

Employees employed for more
than 3 months but less than
2 years are entitled to 1 week's
notice. Employees employed for
more than 2 years but less than
5 are entitled to 2 weeks' notice.
Between 5 and 10 years, 4 weeks'
notice is required and where an
employee has more than 10 years'
service, 8 weeks' notice must be
given.

All employees employed for
more than 3 months except
those employed in the
construction industry.
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Table 7 (cont)
Individual Notice Requirements (1982)
All employees employed for
Employees employed for more
more than 3 months except
than 3 months but less than
those employed in the
2 years are entitled to 1 week's
construction industry.
notice. Employees employed for
more than 2 years but less than
5 years are entitled to 2 weeks'
notice. Between 5 and 10 years,
4 weeks' notice is required and
where an employee has more than
10 years' of employment, 8 weeks'
notice must be given.
All employees employed for
In all cases 1 week's
more than 3 months except farm
notice is required.
workers and construction
workers.

Quebec

Employees employed for less than
1 year are entitled to 1 week's
notice. Employees employed for
more than 1year but less than 5
are entitled to 2 weeks' notice.
Employees employed for between
5 and 10 years are entitled to
4 weeks' notice and those
employed for more than 10 years,
8 weeks' notice.

All employees employed for
more than 3 months except
those under a fixed term
contract and executive officers.

Saskatchewan

Employees employed for more
than 3 months but less than 1 year
are entitled to 1 week's notice.
Employees with more than 1 year
but less than 3 years seniority are
entitled to 2 weeks' notice. For
those with between 3 and 5 years'
of employment, 4 weeks' notice is
required; between 5 and 10 years,
6 weeks' notice is required, and
10 or more years, 8 weeks' notice.

All employees employed for
more than 3 months except
those employed in farming,
ranching, and market gardening.

New Brunswick

Has not enacted legislation
governing notice requirements
upon termination of employment.

Source: The information in this table was compiled on the basis of information provided by the

labour ministries of the federal and provincial governments.

The individual notice requirements are quite modest, although up
to eight weeks' notice may be required in the case of long-serving
employees. In jurisdictions where additional notice periods are provided
in the case of large-scale terminations, up to sixteen weeks' prior notice
may be required if three hundred or more employees are to be dismissed
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in any four-week period. The simultaneous release upon the labour market
of large numbers of employees, many with similar trade skills, creates
greater problems than individual terminations. The group notice
requirements are intended to avoid some of the anticipated lay-offs. They
temper the effects of redundancy by giving employees an opportunity
to prepare for it in the period between the time when notice is given
and the actual date of termination.
The underlying purpose in providing advance notice of redundancies
and lay-offs is to reduce the adverse effects of labour displacement on
both workers and the community. A study by Schulz and Weber
recommended that the requisite notice period should range between six
37
months and one year in the case of permanent lay-offs.
Regardless of the particular labour market framework, advance notice of major
displacement to the workers, the union, and the appropriate government and
community agencies is a procedural prerequisite for constructive action. It gives
the various organizations some time to organize their programmes and permits
individuals to adjust
their own plans as well as to consider the various available
38
options with care.

The Canadian Task Force on Labour Relations likewise recommended
a minimum six-months' notice period in all "technological and related
changes likely to lead to significant labour displacement."39 Like Schulz
and Weber, the Task Force cited advance notice as necessary if
programmes to assist workers and communities affected by large-scale
lay-offs are to be established.
Although neither the federal nor provincial governments have enacted
legislation that provides for notice of up to six months, where group
notice provisions have been provided, the impact of mass terminations
on dependent communities is well recognized. Advance notice of labour
displacement can provide a period of respite during which the adverse
effects of redundancy and lay-offs can be avoided or mitigated. The
question that must be asked, however, is whether prior notice of
termination was utilized to its full extent between 1981 and 1983. This
issue will be particularly relevant in the following section dealing with
the institutional protections available at that time.

37 G. P. Schultz & A.R. Weber, Strategies For the Displaced Worker (New York: Harper &

Row, 1969).
38 Ibid at 190.
39 Privy Council Office, CanadianIndustrialRelations The Report Of The Task ForceOn Labour
Relations (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, December 1968) (Chair H.D. Woods) at 195.
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D. An Assessment of the Legal Protections Provided
In Canada, legal restrictions on the employer's right to lay-off are
imposed at common law, under collective bargaining law, and by existing
labour standards legislation. Perhaps the most significant observation that
can be made is that there appear to be no absolute restrictions imposed
on the employer's right to lay off all or part of his labour force for
economic reasons. Although a number of procedural safeguards are
provided by the law, none of these can be said to provide an employee
with any absolute right to job security.
Lower-level employees facing redundancy in the period 1981-83
received little protection from either the common law or collective
bargaining law. The common law did not provide an accessible means
of protection, while apart from seniority requirements and relatively short
periods of advance notice of lay-off, collective agreements had a limited
impact on the entire question of workforce reductions. In fact, under
the collective bargaining system, less protection would appear to have
been provided than at common law since, in the absence of express
restrictions in the agreement, an employer is free to lay off employees
without notice. This situation contrasts with the position at common law
where the employer has in general no legal right to suspend the
employment relationship without notice.
Because of the inaccessibility of the common law and the limited
application of the collective bargaining system, increased reliance has
been placed on the federal and provincial governments to provide
necessary protection. By the early 1980s, legislation providing for
minimum periods of notice of termination for both unorganized and
organized employees had been enacted in all of Canada, with the exception
of New Brunswick. The extent to which federal and provincial authorities
should be expected to intervene to fill the gaps left by the collective
bargaining system is problematic, however, as is the success of such
legislative intervention.
Of the six jurisdictions that provide group notice protection, four
exclude lay-offs involving fewer than fifty employees. This exclusion
has been justified on the grounds that if the figure was set at a lower
level, extended notice periods would impose an unduly heavy economic
burden on small employers. In Nova Scotia and Quebec, 40 however, the
notice requirements applied to lay-offs of ten or more employees. The
decision of the other four provinces to adopt a threshold figure of fifty
left smaller groups of employees all the more vulnerable because trade
40 Labour Standards Code, S.N.S. 1972, c. 10, s. 68(2); Manpower Vocational Training and
QualificationsAct, S.Q. 1969, c. 51, s.45.
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unions, through which notice protections might have been negotiated,
find it uneconomic to organize groups of employees of fewer than twenty
to twenty-five people. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that
many employees did not receive adequate protection under the individual
notice requirements. One solution to the problem might have been to
extend the length of the individual notice provisions for those employees
with less than ten years continuous employment. Alternatively, the group
notice requirements could have been applied to all lay-offs involving
ten or more employees.
One major criticism of the notice provisions was that only the federal
government had introduced legislation requiring the establishment of
consultative arrangements between employer and employee representatives prior to lay-offs actually taking place. 41 In this respect the most
significant distinction between the position in almost all of the Canadian
jurisdictions and those in many Western European countries and Japan,
for example, was not the procedure governing the selection of employees
for lay-off, nor the length of notice required, but the requirements placed
on the employer in the period between deciding to lay off and the
terminations actually taking effect.
In both Western Europe and Japan, considerable importance has
been placed on joint consultation prior to redundancies occurring.
Emphasis has been placed on establishing an 'early warning' system and
providing the notice of termination to which employees are entitled. The
limitations on effective consultation through the collective bargaining
process have been offset in some countries, such as Belgium, France,
West Germany, and the Netherlands, by developing a 'works council'
system. In such a forum, consultation on mass lay-offs frequently occurs
directly between management and employees, rather than through unions.
This is significant since in many of those countries the trade union
movement has concentrated primarily on the acquisition of direct, material
benefits, such as rates of pay and hours of work, rather than employment
security protections. In Canada there is no direct counterpart to the works
council, and, as a result, consultation procedures for dealing with large
scale lay-offs have been less highly developed.
The Carrothers Commission reported to the federal government on
the economic, institutional, and social dimension of lay-offs in Canada
and the inadequacy of protections negotiated through the collective
bargaining process. 42 It concluded that the hitherto accepted philosophy
41 Labour Adjustments Benefits Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 89 amending the Canada Labour
Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1.
42 See Carrothers, supra, note 17.
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that economic efficiency justified lay-offs was being challenged by the
idea that management had definite and definable social and economic
responsibilities and obligations. The report emphasized that, other than
notice and severance pay protections, there were no requirements concerning redundancy management in Canadian legislation. The Commission stressed that the purpose of advance notice is not merely to allow
a period of time to locate alternative employment: "[Ilt is essential to
any socially responsible and rational process of human resource management that there should be sufficient time and effort to carry out a
program aimed at avoiding or reducing lay-offs arising from
43
redundancies."
It was recommended that a 'period of notice of intent' be required
as a type of early warning system, similar to that mentioned above. During
this period the parties would jointly research the implications of technological and other change likely to result in lay-offs. Regarding the
actual decision to introduce changes in production techniques, cut-backs
in the labour force, or whatever, the Commission said that employee
representatives should be consulted prior to the final decision being taken
to provide them with the opportunity to influence management. Where
lay-offs were necessary, consultation procedures should be codified in
law in order to limit the number of people laid-off and mitigate
accompanying hardships. This recommendation was implemented by
amendments to the Canada Labour Code in 1983.44
At the height of the recession in 1982-83, the existing pre-termination
notice requirements were found to be inadequate as a means of achieving
structured procedures for implementing adjustment measures. The establishment of joint consultative procedures might possibly have led to
a recognition of the responsibilities of each of the parties and a willingness
to assume those responsibilities. The need for a shift away from the
traditional adversarial approach of collective bargaining towards the
development of a more co-operative approach to the problems created
by large-scale labour displacement must be recognized.
The question whether or not legislated consultation requirements
would have provided any greater protection in a lay-off situation than
the protections that were available in the early 1980s remains unanswered.
Without a doubt, redundancy and lay-off should be matters ofjoint concern
and discussion. Despite this, in the absence of a genuine commitment
from both employer and trade union representatives, consultation alone
does not provide a real guarantee of added protection. A strong argument
43 Ibid. at para. 465, cf para. 217.
44 See, supra,note 41.
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could be made that all management decisions likely to create lay-offs,
not merely those-relating to technological change, should ultimately be
subject to joint bargaining processes and the possible imposition of
economic sanctions. The use of economic weaponry, however, may give
rise to other problems. Even with mandatory consultation prior to layoff, the availability of economic sanctions could destroy any possibility
of a co-operative approach being taken to the redundancy problem.
As an alternative to allowing strikes or lock-outs where agreement
is not reached, there remains the possibility of submitting all disputes
to third-party arbitration for resolution. 45 This form of interest arbitration
is fraught with many practical problems, not least of which is that the
accepted neutrality of the entire arbitration process may be undermined
if it fails to satisfy the demands of both sets of disputants.
Joint consultation and collective bargaining raise many issues of
legal definition. If consultation is to be made mandatory, in which instances
should it be required? At which stage should it become effective? What
should happen in cases where an impasse is reached? Should bargaining
and the right to strike or lock out come into play at this stage? How
can unorganized employees be provided greater protection? What percentage of the employer's workforce would have to be affected before
the duty to consult and bargain would become operative? If consultation
and the right to reopen the collective agreement for bargaining were
required in every case in which lay-offs may occur as a result of managerial
initiative, would it be necessary to distinguish between decisions which
result directly in lay-offs and those resulting indirectly in lay-offs? Would
the duty to consult and the bargaining alternative apply equally to both
cases? Perhaps the major issue regarding reopener clauses is the effect
that legislation of this nature would have on what has traditionally been
viewed in Canada as the sanctity of the collective agreement. Management
would likely vigorously oppose legislative reform in this direction.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Recognition of the fact that redundancies and lay-offs are issues
of general public concern has prompted federal and provincial government
action to alleviate the adverse effects of job loss and labour market
adjustment. This task has been complicated by the division of legislative
powers between Parliament and the ten provincial legislatures under the
ConstitutionAc4 1867.46 The legislative boundary is far from clear and
45 Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 212, ss 74-78.
46 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict, c. 3.
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the responsibility of each level of government for particular aspects of
the lay-off problem has not always been evident.
Jurisdiction over industrial and labour relations is divided between
Parliament and the provincial legislatures. The federal government has
jurisdiction over the federal public service and federal works or undertakings in the private sector. Examples of the latter include interprovincial
and international trade, transportation and communications, and banking.
In areas under its control, Parliament has been able to impose restrictions
on the employer's right to lay off. Generally, however, industrial and
labour relations issues are deemed to be matters of property and civil
rights and therefore within provincial jurisdiction. Only about 10 percent
of Canadian private sector employees fall within federal jurisdiction.
Consequently, for the remaining 90 percent, federal government influence
has been exerted only indirectly through the federal spending power and
control of the national purse strings.
Constitutional limitations and the decentralized nature of the federal
system in Canada have prevented mandatory manpower planning and
centralized policies. As a result, the federal government response to the
problem of redundancies and lay-offs has been essentially reactionary,
in the sense that its impact has been felt almost entirely after redundancies
have occurred. The reactionary response can be seen in the relief of
economic hardship through the unemployment insurance scheme and
the recently enacted LabourAdjustmentBenefitsAct, programmes designed
to fill existing job vacancies and create new jobs.
A. Relief of Economic Hardship
1. Unemployment insurance
The unemployment insurance scheme operates as a social insurance
programme and is designed to provide temporary income support to
workers between jobs. The scheme is exclusively within federal legislative
jurisdiction 47 and is financed by employer and employee premium
contributions and the federal government. Benefits are portable across
the country and are not subject to artificial geographical barriers.
Entitlement under the scheme depends upon a claimant having worked
under a contract of employment and suffered an "interruption of earnings."
For regular benefit entitlement this is defined under the Unemployment
Insurance Commission (mtci)regulations as a separation from employment
of seven or more consecutive days during which no work is performed

47 Unemployment InsuranceAc; 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
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and in respect of which no earnings are received. 48 Consequently,
employees placed on short-time work arrangements will rarely meet the
qualifying criteria. The benefit ceiling is revised annually. In 1983 the
maximum payment provided was $210 per week.
Unemployment insurance (uI) plays an extremely important income
maintenance function to supplement notice and severance payments and
thus reduce the economic hardship that accompanies job loss. The scheme
provides a basic underpinning to the labour market by 'buying time'
for implementing other adjustment measures such as job placement,
training, and mobility programmes. A number of drawbacks are, however,
associated with the provision of uI benefits. The fact that an income
cushion is provided may make it easier for employers to lay-off workers
as a cost-reducing device. This is particularly true in the case of seasonal
workers laid off in response to annual variations in economic activity.
Moreover, the income protection provided may increase measured duration through longer job search periods and may create49an element
of dependency on the scheme inhibiting mobility of labour.
Although it is difficult to assess the impact of uI on the labour
market, in recent years the negative effects of benefit payments have
attracted much attention in Canada. Reflecting recessionary trends, the
qualifying rules were tightened in the 1980s in response to employer
arguments that readily available benefit payments may have reduced
labour force attachment and the incentive to seek re-employment,
particularly in multi-earner families.
The alleged dangers of abuse and the problems created by the 'workshy' is a very subjective concept. No doubt abuses do occur. Proponents
of the, argument that benefit levels had, for some people, decreased their
incentive to find work were able to point to the paradox of manpower
shortages occurring simultaneously with persistently high levels of unemployment. While this hypothesis was supported by some empirical
evidence, it was by no means decisive, and equally cogent evidence to
the contrary could be found.50

48 Unemployment InsuranceRegulations C.R.C. 1978, c. 1576; cf. SOR/81-117, SOR/81-562,
SOR/81-625, SOR/81-1108, SOR/82-44, SOR/82-245, SOR/82-246.

49 Canada, Labour Market Development in the 1980.v A Report of the Task Force on Labour
Market Development Preparedfor the Minister of Employment and Immigration as a Contribution

to a Process of Consultation with Provincial Governments and Organizations Representing Different
Elements of the Private Sector (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, July 1981) at 12 [hereinafter
Labour Market Development in the 1980s].
50 The Paradoxof Unemployment andJob Vacancies Some Theories Confrontedby Data (Study
No. 9) by M.L. Skolnick & F. Siddiqui (Toronto: Research Branch, Ontario Ministry of Labour,
1974).
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Doubtless U1 benefits can result in a cycle of dependency where
individuals alternate between short-term employment and unemployment
insurance. However, the Task Force on Unemployment Insurance in the
1980s published in 198151 tended to over emphasize the disincentive
effect of UI benefit payments. The argument that levels of payment
undermine the work ethic should not be overly stressed. The vast majority
of unemployment cases are caused by conditions beyond the influence
of the individual worker, as was apparent from the Statistics Canada
data considered in Section II.
While the unemployment insurance scheme is not specifically directed to the problems caused by large or small scale lay-offs, it is,
nevertheless, the primary source of economic support for employees who
have been made redundant in Canada. In recent years, a growing
awareness has emerged that the provision of income maintenance alone
is not a sufficient response to the unemployment problem. Recognizing
the need for alternative solutions likely to encourage and facilitate longterm job attachment, three developmental schemes for use of unemployment insurance funds were included in the 1975-76 employment strategy.
These were work sharing (which will be considered subsequently),
occupational training, and job creation.
The goal of UIC-sponsored training was to develop new skills and
upgrade existing ones to help claimants return to productive employment.
Some 100,000 claimant-trainees annually received about $200 million
in UI benefits. This represented almost 60 percent of the trainees in
institutional training courses sponsored by the Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission in 1981. Application of the UI subsidized
programme created administrative difficulties due to the inconsistent
treatment of trainee and non-trainee claimants and the overlap with the
principal federal government training scheme under the Adult Occupational Training Act.52
The use of unemployment insurance funds for developmental job
creation projects was not particularly successful. The main criticism made
by the Task Force was that while considerably higher costs were involved,
demonstrable benefits that might justify increased expenditure were
difficult to evaluate or assess. A total of $20 million was set aside for
job creation purposes in 1982.53

51 Employment and Immigration Canada, Task Force on Unemployment Insurancein the 1980s
(Hull, Que.: Supply & Services Canada, August 1981).

52 Ibid at 81-82; Adult OccupationalTrainingAct, R.S.C. 1970, c. A-2 as rep. NationalTraining
Act, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 109, s. 17.
53 Job CreationBenefits 1982, Order,SOR/82-256.
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While schemes of this nature may indicate that a more positive
approach to unemployment was being taken and that a shift away from
the provision of purely impersonal economic assistance had occurred,
the impact would appear to have been fairly minimal. Increasingly, it
appeared that employees who were unable to find employment were
having to rely on provincial welfare assistance when their uI benefits
were exhausted. A survey conducted in 198254 showed that one-third
of all welfare recipients were considered employable, whereas a few
years earlier, "unemployed employables" accounted for between 5 percent
and 10 percent of total welfare cases. This increase may have been a
direct result of retrenchment in the uI scheme under the 1979 amendments
which created higher entrance requirements for repeaters, re-entrants,
and new entrants. The extent of the spillover from unemployment
insurance to welfare was such that provincial social assistance was fast
becoming a second-level unemployment insurance system.
2. The Labour Adjustments Benefits Program
Growing reliance on provincial welfare assistance may have been
one of the reasons why the Labour Adjustment Benefits Act 55 was passed.
The Act was intended to supplement existing labour market assistance
programmes by providing financial support for workers laid off from
federally designated industries. The legislation was primarily directed
to lay-offs in the clothing, textile, and footwear industries, particularly
in Quebec and Ontario. It was one of the few programmes that dealt
specifically with employees and communities affected by mass lay-offs.
Workers who had been laid off were eligible for benefits equalling
60 percent of their pre-lay-off average insurable earnings if the layoff involved either fifty or more employees, or at least 10 percent of
the plant labour force. Additionally, the employee must have been laid
off from an industry situated in a designated community, a Canadian
citizen resident in Canada between fifty-four and sixty-five years of age
when laid off, and have been employed in the industry for at least ten
of the fifteen years prior to the lay-off.56
If an employee satisfied the criteria, he or she could apply to the
Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC) for labour
adjustment benefits. Furthermore, if the employee had claimed and
exhausted all Ui benefits, was not recdiving a retirement pension under
54 R. Stephens, "Welfare Becomes Last Resort for Jobless" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail
(29 March 1982) Al.
55 LabourAdjustments Benefits Act, supra, note 41.
56 Ibid ss 3,10,13,14.
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the Canada or Quebec Pension Plans, and was deemed to have no present
prospect of employment (with or without training or relocation assistance),
then he or she was entitled to receive adjustment benefits.57
The scheme's effectiveness in alleviating the disruptive effects of
mass terminations is open to debate. It would appear that both the
complexity and plethora of qualifying criteria that had to be satisfied
before assistance would be provided may have restricted its impact.
Financial constraints due to cut-backs in federal government expenditures
may also have had an effect.
B. ProgrammesAimed at Filling Existing Job Vacancies
Employees who are laid off may receive assistance in obtaining
re-employment through numerous federal government programmes administered by the CEIC. The Commission carries prime responsibility
for employment-related programmes. The following were among the more
important services provided in 1982.
1. The Canada Employment Service
The CEIC operates more than five hundred employment centres
offering job information, counselling, and contacts with employers. The
major priority of the employment service is to help job seekers to find
jobs and employers to find suitable workers. A Central Labour Market
Unit was set up in 1978 which, among other things, attempts to provide
information on labour shortages and surpluses. Other employment information services included 'Choices', a computerized information centre
which compiled occupational data, and 'Jobscan', an automated system
aimed at improving placement services, monitoring the occupational
aspects of the unemployment insurance programme, and providing
forecasts of labour market supply and demand. The most recent addition
at that time, the 'National Job Bank', a Canada-wide telephone-computer
hook-up, provided an inventory of jobs that could not be filled locally
and was aimed at relieving the supply-demand imbalances causing critical
skill shortages.
Despite the apparent comprehensive nature of the services provided,
it would appear that their quantity far exceeded their quality, Employers
were particularly critical of the lack of adequate screening ofjob applicants
before referral. 58 This criticism may be reflected in the fact that of a
57 Ibid s. 16.
58 ManpowerRequirements And Hiring Plans Of Ontario EmployersIn ManufacturingIndustrier

Survey Results (Toronto: Office of the Secretariat, Ontario Manpower Commission, October 1979)
at 18.
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total of 1,043,316 job placements made in fiscal year 1980-81,209,507,
or just under 21 percent, lasted less than one week.59 Studies of jobhunting behaviour have shown that employees were also critical of the
services provided and often preferred to rely on informal methods of
job search through, for example, personal contacts. Since employers were
not required to register job vacancies with Canada Employment Centres,
very incomplete listings of available employment opportunities may have
been kept on record.
2. The Canada Manpower Consultative Service
The Manpower Consultative Service has particular relevance to group
dismissals. When a large-scale lay-off is likely, the Consultative Service
attempts to set up a manpower adjustment committee composed of
employer and trade union representatives with an independent chairperson.
The committee's main purpose is to facilitate joint labour-management
research and planning to further opportunities for re-employment. Attempts may be made to arrange for transfers of employees to other
branches in the existing corporate structure and to contact customers,
suppliers, and competitors of the immediate employer in the hope of
finding job openings.
Various provincial authorities, CEIC, and employers share the cost
of these committees. In Ontario, for example, the Ministry of Labour
normally contributes 15 to 25 percent of the cost of these committees
up to a maximum of $1,000. CEIC usually pays up to 50 percent and
the employer pays the remainder. In Ontario, in those cases where
adjustment committees were established in 1978-79 and 1979-80, efforts
to secure re-employment for workers who were being laid off appear
to have achieved a reasonable level of success. In 1978-79, 64.6 percent
of laid-off employees were relocated in alternative employment as a
direct result of the efforts of committee members, while in 1979-80
just over 60 percent were relocated. 60
While undoubtedly the placement service had been of considerable
benefit in lay-off situations, its effectiveness was hindered by a failure
to fully co-ordinate federal and provincial manpower policies. The major
drawbacks were a lack of available data on job vacancies and the lack
of an inventory of the occupational skills of redundant workers. The
impact of the placement service may have been further restricted by
59 Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, Annual ReportfortheFiscalYear 19801981 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1981) [hereinafter Annual Report].
60 Select Committee on Plant Closures and Employee Adjustment, Draft F'malReport(Toronto:
Legislative Assembly, 29 January 1981).
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the fact that its effectiveness depended upon the availability of employment
vacancies similar to those previously occupied by employees who were
laid off. In many cases these simply were not available, particularly in
regions experiencing structural unemployment. To overcome this problem
it was essential that the placement service be supported by re-training
and mobility assistance schemes.
3. The Canada Manpower Mobility Program
The Canada Manpower Mobility programme encourages the geographic mobility of workers who are underemployed, unemployed, or
about to become unemployed and for whom work is not available locally.
Various exploratory, relocation, and travel assistance grants are provided.
Given regional diversity, varying rates of regional unemployment, population dispersion, and Canada's size, mobility of labour is particularly
important. However, it is also particularly costly. In the 1980-81 fiscal
year, almost $7.8 million was spent under the mobility programme. 61
The underlying object of the programme is to defray relocation and
job search costs. In the case of relocation grants, the recipient must
demonstrate that he cannot find comparable work in the immediate
locality and that he is moving to a job in the nearest area where suitable
positions are available. The amount of payment a person receives depends
upon family size, number of dependants, and the length of time the
employee has been unemployed. 62
While regional disparities in job opportunities and the impact of
mass lay-offs on dependent communities require increased geographic
and occupational mobility, a number of factors have prevented the
achievement of this objective. Age, a lack of adequate educational training,
and family ties always weigh heavily when deciding whether or not to
move. Research has shown that older workers and low-wage employees
are least inclined to move even though they experience the most difficulty
in finding work. 63 To overcome some of these problems, the Task Force
on Labour Market Development recommended in 1981 that the government provide wage subsidies to offset employer reluctance to employ
workers falling within these categories and to ensure that those workers
were provided with short-term training packages to update their skills.
61 See Annual Report, supra, note 59.
62 Generally, see the Labour MobilHiy and Assessment Incentive Regulations, C.R.C. Vol. 3,
c. 330; cf SOR/80-112, SOR/80-778, SOR/81-582.

63 B. Portis & M.G. Suys, The Effect of Advance Notice in a Plant Shutdowr A Study of
the Closing of the KelvinatorPlantin London Ont (London, Ont.: School of Business Administration,

The University of Western Ontario, 1970).
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Institutional barriers such as the differing provincial requirements
for licensing, certification, and qualifications for practicing a trade also
created artificial impediments to freer movement of labour. As well,
increasing prevalence of multi-earner families and the availability of UI
benefits may have reduced the need to move to obtain employment.
The combined effect of personal and institutional factors added
considerably to the difficulties involved in ensuring greater labour mobility.
In the early 1980s, rather than address these difficulties directly, emphasis
was placed on the creation of make-work schemes in areas suffering
particularly high levels of unemployment. This approach merely perpetuated the existing problems and detracted from the need to provide
medium or long-term strategies likely to have a more lasting effect. If
an adequate manpower mobility programme was to emerge, increased
training programmes to enable laid-off employees to acquire portable
trade skills and greater co-operation between the federal and provincial
governments in employment and education policies to remove a number
of the existing institutional barriers had to be sought.
4.

The Canada Manpower Training Program

Employment training is perhaps the key element in the process of
labour market adjustment, and the most constructive response to layoffs. The primary object of manpower training programmes is to ensure
that the unemployed worker returns to productive employment. The
Canada Manpower Training scheme was governed in 1982 by the Adult
OccupationalTrainingAct, and provided two distinct training programmes.
The first was the provision of institutional training courses at colleges
and vocational schools. The second was the Canada Manpower Industrial
Training Programme (CNHTP). It had five subsidiary goals relevant to
this paper- encourage employers to establish new employee training
programmes and improve existing ones; alleviate persistent skill shortages;
prevent lay-off of workers due to technological or other changes; increase
employment opportunities for unemployed workers who lacked marketable skills; and provide incentive for employers to hire and train 'special
64
needs' clients or train present employees who met this definition.
Under CMIrP, agreements regarding on-the-job training schemes
were drawn up between CEIC and employers. Each agreement normally
provided that the employer would be reimbursed for the cost of training
and for a portion of the trainees' wages, usually up to 40 percent for
employees who had been previously hired by the employer, up to 60

64 See, LabourMarket Development in the 1980s, supra, note 49 at 231.
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percent for persons hired specifically for training, and up to 85 percent
for special needs workers. In fiscal year 1980-81, almost 80,000 trainees
enrolled in the industrial training programme, costing the federal gov65
ernment $106 million.
In each province, federal-provincial Manpower Needs Committees
established the priorities that determined the sectors in which subsidies
would be granted for institutional and industrial training purposes. From
a number of surveys, it appears that the training programmes had limited
impact in matching the demand for skilled labour with an over-abundant
supply. The major problem was the mismatch between worker skills
and the skill requirements of available jobs. The seriousness of this
imbalance was emphasized in the following passage: "One of the most
critical human resource problems that Canada faces in the 1980s is the
shortage of skilled tradesmen. Despite high unemployment in the country,
many sectors of the economy are experiencing a serious imbalance
"66
between the supply of and demand for skilled workers ....
5. The Critical Trade Skills Training Program
Industrial skills training under the Canada Manpower Training
Programme had concentrated largely on providing fairly basic skills to
improve the general employability of the unemployed. As a result, the
programme may have performed a certain income maintenance function
while removing individuals from the register of unemployed. This may
have obscured the need to provide training in the skills required in the
labour market and necessitated increased reliance upon skilled immigrant
labour. Although industrial training expenditure as a percentage of total
training expenditures gradually increased from 9.6 percent in 1975-76
to 15.2 percent in 1979-80, this was not sufficient. 67 Shortages continued
to exist, most often in a number of highly skilled occupations.
A number of surveys emphasized the severity of the skilled labour
problem. The results of a study done by the Ontario Manpower Commission in October 1979 indicated that employers were becoming
increasingly concerned about the shortage of skilled tradesmen in the
manufacturing sector. 68 Of the employers who responded to the study,
approximately 50 percent reported recruitment difficulties. Almost 68
percent of available job openings were for machine operators, general
65 See Annual Report,supra, note 59.
66 See Wood & Kumar, supra,note 23 at 39.

67 See Labour Market Development in the 1980s,supra, note 49.
68 ManpowerRequirements And Hiring PlansOf Ontario Employers In ManufacturingIndusiev"

Survey Results, supra, note 58.
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machinists, labourers, electricians, tool-die and mould makers, welders,
assemblers, fitters, and analysts. Fifty-four percent of the respondents
reported plans to expand their manpower during the following twelve
months. Of these, 88 percent anticipated further recruitment difficulties,
mainly due to a lack of specialized skills and on-the-job experience.
In response to the shortage of skilled labour, a Critical Trade Skills
Training Programme was included in the Canada Manpower Training
scheme in 1979-80. The scheme was specifically designed to produce
the highly skilled blue-collar workers then in short supply. Financial
assistance for a period of two years, or half the time required to reach
a specific level of occupational proficiency, was provided. In the 1980-81
fiscal year, $7,504,983 was spent under the programme to train 4,102
employees. 69 Although shortages of critical trades people may have been
infrequent, they were capable of causing severe bottlenecks and disrupting
entire production processes.
Alleviation of the problems caused by existing shortages would have
required industry as a whole to shoulder a greater responsibility for
employee training and apprenticeship programmes. A study conducted
by the Ontario Ministry of Universities and Colleges 70 showed that of
seventy-nine companies surveyed, 39 percent provided no training whatsoever, 41 percent used 'in-house' training, 10 percent used an apprenticeship system, and 10 percent used both. Significantly, among nontraining firms, 84 percent reported shortages of skilled labourers.
After it was accepted that increased training focusing on comprehensive long-term skill development was needed, two issues arose. First,
who was to be responsible for supervising training programmes, and
second, who was to be responsible for training expenditures. The cost
of training had always been a major deterrent to employers, particularly
to small businesses. Outlays on training were never seen as particularly
secure investments due to the predatory recruiting practices of non-training
firms.
One possible solution was government-instigated training. Manpower
counsellors seemed, however, to have been unable to match occupational
training to occupational need. If greater emphasis had been placed on
employer-instigated training schemes, this problem might have been
overcome. Individual employers who were more aware of existing
shortages in their workforce could have directed training efforts to remedy
these.

69 See Annual Report, supra, note 59 at Appendices 3, 4.
70 Wood & Kumar, supra, note 23 at 40.
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On the issue of cost, the Commission of Inquiry on Educational
Leave and Productivity recommended in its report in 1979 that a levygrant system of subsidized training be implemented.71 Under the proposal,
the employer would have been required to spend 0.5 percent of his or
her payroll on vocational training. An employer spending this amount
could reduce tax liability by an amount greater than that spent on training.
Those who spent less would be required to submit the difference to the
government, the object being to increase general or transferable skill
training by spreading the burden of cost.
In 1981 the Task Force on Labour Market Development in the
1980s 72 recommended against adopting a levy-grant system in Canada.
The Task Force considered the British Industry Training scheme which
had been operated on a levy-grant basis for a number of years. It concluded
that the enormous administrative difficulties and lack of evidence that
it reduced 'poaching' of trained employees limited the value of such
a scheme.73
Since most other forms of institutional training were financed out
of general revenues in Canada, skills acquisition in industry should,
arguably, have been financed in a similar fashion. A significant factor
to be considered in this respect is the impact that cyclical instability
has had on employer-sponsored programmes in the past. During an
economic downturn firms often implement cost-cutting measures which
can include laying off apprentice-trainees and curtailment of training
programmes. This in turn leads to shortages of skilled tradesmen during
an upturn and contributes to market tightness. On this basis, public
expenditure was required to reduce the impact of cyclical swings on
training schemes, reduce disparities in costs to individual employers who
provided on-the-job training, and promote greater equality of access to
trades training.
Increased use of public revenues for industrial skills training would
have served two related purposes. First, employees who were laid off
would have been provided with the opportunity to acquire the trade skills
necessary to enable them to return to gainful employment. Second, by
emphasizing the importance of industrial trade training, the existing
emphasis on post-secondary institutional training would have been
reduced, providing a better balance of incentives for appropriate career
selection. The combined effect would have reduced future shortages in
71 Canada, Commission of Inquiry on Educational Leave and Productivity, Education and
Working Canadians: Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Educational Leave and Productivity

(Ottawa: Labour Canada, 1979).
72 Supra, note 49.
73 Ibid at 165.
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critical trade skills. To overcome those problems, a better balance of
employer-instigated and government-financed training schemes was
required.
C. ProgrammesDesigned to CreateNew Jobs
In recent years, considerable emphasis has been placed onjob creation
at both the federal and provincial government levels. In the past, this
was intended to deal more generally with the problems created by a
growing labour force and declining employment opportunities. Increasingly, direct job creation is being relied upon to alleviate some of the
problems caused by plant closures and mass lay-offs in regions experiencing structural employment difficulties. By the early 1980s, a number
of schemes had been implemented to provide both medium and shortterm employment. Although some of these schemes have been abandoned
or replaced, a number remain in effect.
1. The Canada Works Program
The Canada Works Program provided funding in regions of high
unemployment for short-term job creation projects proposed by local
organizations. The fourth and final phase of the programme was carried
out in fiscal year 1979-80 with total federal funding of $100 million.
Funds were allocated to those provinces that had labour surpluses of
greater than 9 percent.
Canada Works had an emergency procedure designed to provide
a fast response to sudden large-scale job loss caused by unforeseen events
such as major plant closures in small communities. The emergency
response feature was not widely used. In 1977-78, thirty-two projects
were approved involving approximately 230 jobs. In 1978-79, only three
projects were approved, all in Quebec, for a total federal government
74
contribution of $178,786, which created nineteen jobs.
The entire Canada Works Program ended in March 1981 and was
replaced by the Canada Community Development Scheme, which provided financial aid for community employment projects proposed by local
organizations. These projects usually lasted from three to nine months
in duration and were designed to create jobs in areas of high unemployment. By March 1982, a total of $110 million had been contributed
to the labour, material, and overhead costs of approved projects.
74 CanadaEmployment andImmigration Commission Annual Reportfor the Fiscal Year 19781979 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1979) and Canada Employment and Immigration
Commision Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1979-1980 (Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada,
1980).
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2. The Employment Tax Credit Program
The Employment Tax Credit Program, introduced in March 1978,
was designed to stimulate employment in the private sector. The programme provided employers with a tax credit if they hired unemployed
workers in addition to their normal workforce requirements. The employees involved had to be unemployed when hired and safeguards were
set out to ensure that credit was given only for employees whom the
employer would not otherwise have hired. The tax credit was worth up
to $4,160 per year for each eligible employee, depending upon the
particular region where the employee worked. In fiscal year 1979-80,
over 50,000 jobs were created at an estimated cost of $100 million. 75
The Tax Credit programme expired in March 1981 and was not replaced.
3. The Local Employment Assistance Program (LEAP)
LEAP provided funds to individuals, groups, or organizations in an
effort to create long-term employment opportunities for the chronically
unemployed. Like the Community Development scheme, LEAP operated
through specific projects which were screened by provincial review boards.
In fiscal year 1980-81, the 875 LEAP projects cost a total of $58.7 million.
These projects created almost 7,000 medium to long-term jobs for
76
seriously disadvantaged people throughout Canada.

4. Miscellaneous job creation schemes
In addition to the Canada Community Development scheme, three
other job creation projects were established in fiscal year 1980-81. Under
the New Technology Employment Program, subsidies were provided to
firms that hired unemployed or under-employed post-secondary graduates
to work in areas of research or development. The Local Economic
Development Assistance Program was an experimental scheme intended
to help increase business development in slow growth communities. The
programme was designed primarily to stimulate private sector employment through developing local enterprises. The third project, the Canada
Community Services Program was another pilot scheme aimed at creating
new jobs for the unemployed while at the same time attempting to improve
social and cultural services.
The most significant developments in direct job creation occurred
in 1982. Under the New Employment Expansion and Development (NEED)
75 Some 50,906 jobs were created. See Canada Employment and Immigration Commission
Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1979-1980,ibid
76 See Annual Report, supra, note 59.
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Program, the federal government committed $500 million to promote
employment opportunities for unemployed persons experiencing significant hardship. The first phase of the scheme came into existence in
the fall of 1982 and was scheduled to run until the end of March 1983.
The scheme was to be supplemented by provincial contributions. In
Ontario, for example, the Canada-Ontario Employment Development
Program was established. The programme was equally funded by the
governments of Canada and Ontario. Applications for support could be
registered by non-profit organizations, registered businesses, partnerships,
corporations, and Ontario government ministries and agencies. Federal
and provincial agencies were not required to contribute to the costs of
the programme, whereas private sector employers were normally required
to provide from 25 to 50 percent of the necessary funding.
The projects approved were essentially labour intensive and were
directed primarily to help employees who had exhausted their unemployment insurance entitlement. The projects had to last between twelve
weeks and twelve months and provide employment for three or more
workers. The scheme provided on average $400 per week per employee
to meet wages and other costs. In Ontario, the scheme was scheduled
to create 8,000 jobs before the end of March 1983, when the combined
federal and provincial committment of $200 million would be exhausted.
While job creation projects of this nature were not primarily designed
to combat the problems faced by employees who had lost their jobs
due to a workforce reduction, increasing numbers of these workers became
eligible for assistance as their uI entitlement expired.
D. Summary
In Canada, recognition of the fact that the problems created by
lay-offs and redundancies is an economic and social issue of general
public concern has prompted federal government action. Because of the
division of legislative powers under the Canada Act, 1867, highly
centralized economic policies and mandatory planning have not been
possible. The federal government can only directly intervene and impose
restrictions on the management prerogative to lay-off in federal work
or undertakings. For the vast majority of employees, therefore, the
influence of the federal government has only been felt indirectly through
the Unemployment Insurance and Labour Adjustment Benefits schemes
and re-employment programmes administered by CEIC.
Unemployment insurance benefits are substantial by international
standards, and this may be one of the reasons why lenient restrictions
have been imposed on the employer's right to lay-off in Canada.77 In
77 See Labour Market Development in the 1980s, supra, note 49 at 32.
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the late 1970s, however, a growing awareness emerged that economic
assistance alone was not sufficient. Large quantities of public funds were
spent on schemes designed to create increased employment opportunities
for employees who had been laid off.
For a number of reasons, however, the services provided were not
as effective as they might have been. The existing structure appeared
to lack cohesion and resulted in a jumble of disjointed and overlapping
schemes. These were severely criticized by the Carrothers Commission,
Too often ... individual expectations would be crushed by word that institutional

training places were unavailable or that there were no job vacancies registered
with the local employment office. Manpower counsellors seem unable to match

concrete occupational development efforts (training, job search, mobility, etc.) with
specific occupational vacancies except in the most highly skilled categories. All
of this is discouraging to the job seeker and in the
absence of extraordinary efforts
78
he is likely to join the ranks of the unemployed.

Many of the problems were compounded because jurisdiction over

employment and education is shared between the federal and provincial
governments. Quite often this resulted in inaction or, at the other extreme,
duplication of function. To improve the rather ad hoc approach that
was taken, it was necessary to devise and implement manpower policies
aimed directly at the correction of supply and demand imbalances in
the labour market. This would have required improved data collection
on existing job vacancies and the occupational qualifications of workers
who had lost their jobs, more reliable forecasting, the establishment of
uniform training, certification, recognition standards among the provinces
to promote greater labour mobility, and increased domestic training that
emphasized the need to acquire portable trade skills.
Faced with the spectre of unprecedented levels of unemployment
in 1982 and 1983, both the federal and provincial governments placed
considerable emphasis on direct job creation to offset the existing slack
in labour demand. Undoubtedly new jobs were needed in some areas.
However, since there were current shortages in the skilled trade occupations, greater emphasis should have been placed on matching current
job vacancies with the unemployed labour force, rather than attempting
to create entirely new jobs.
Too often, direct job creation provides short-run employment and
fails to produce a solution to long-term structural problems. Schemes
of this nature are essentially labour intensive. The result is that support
for non-wage elements such as physical and financial capital, that would
be likely to have a longer-term impact on the social and economic
78 See Carrothers, supra, note 17 at para. 547.
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infrastructures of targeted communities, has been minimal.79 Since job
creation schemes have little permanent impact on demand conditions,
they may have merely cycled people back to the ranks of the unemployed
with renewed unemployment insurance eligibility.
Job creation is appealing in that it offsets, in the short-term, earlier
labour market failings in training and education policies. While supplyside deficiencies may be temporarily resolved, the danger is that shortterm job creation schemes generate an acceptance of periodic lay-off
and promote greater reliance on the unemployment insurance scheme
when work is not provided. Make-work schemes tend to detract from
the importance of providing adequate job training and related skills
acquisition that can produce a more secure attachment to jobs and the
labour force as a whole.
As a counter-cyclical measure, direct job creation is undoubtedly
useful since it can be phased in and out relatively quickly. However,
in regions with high levels of unemployment and little prospect for future
economic recovery, a longer-term developmental approach was needed.
Relevant and accessible training and mobility assistance may have
provided a more appropriate response.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO LAY-OFFS AND REDUNDANCIES
The legal and institutional protections discussed above reflect an
essentially reactionary response to the problems created by lay-offs. Much
of the protection provided has been of a negative sort, coming into effect
after the decision to lay-off was taken. Legislative emphasis on advance
notice, severance pay, and re-employment measures appeared to treat
lay-offs as the most appropriate response to decreased levels of economic
activity. This attitude was also reflected in negotiated protections under
collective bargaining law. Increasingly, however, as unemployment figures
grew, alternatives to lay-offs as a means of maintaining fuller employment
levels were attracting greater attention. The two major thrusts in this
direction were work sharing and early retirement schemes.
A.

Work Sharing

Labour Canada data on the content of collective agreements indicate
that work sharing, by either a reduction in hours or a division of work,
was not widely used to prevent or minimize lay-offs.80 The Canadian
79 Labour Market Development in the 1980s, supra, note 49 at 138 seriously questions the
applicability of the widespread job creation projects as a multi-purpose tool to tackle unemployment.
80 See the Labour Canada data on the content of collective agreeements in Table 3. See
also R.W. Crowley, "Worksharing and Layoffs" (1979) 34 Relat. Ind. 329.
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labour movement has generally been hostile to the whole concept of
work sharing. This hostility may have been largely due to the fact that
work-sharing arrangements negate accrued seniority rights. More senior
union members who were unlikely to be affected by lay-offs were often
unwilling to participate in schemes involving wage reductions. The
emphasis placed on job rights acquired through long-service and the
sanctity of negotiated seniority protections cannot be over-emphasized.
Employers may have been hostile to work sharing because of the
possibility of increased costs arising from the obligation to maintain full
fringe benefits while productivity was lowered by a reduction in hours
worked. The administrative difficulties involved, and the possibility that
a shorter work week might become the norm may also have deterred
interested employers.
From the trade union perspective, work sharing which results in
a retention of employees may maintain union membership levels and
consequently union dues. This could conceivably prevent the decertification that might occur if a large number of unionized employees were
laid off. Weighed against the importance of seniority in a lay-off situation,
however, these arguments are unlikely to prove particularly persuasive.
From the employer's perspective, the arguments in favour of work
sharing appear more convincing. Increased costs accompanying work
sharing through the maintenance of fringe benefits might offset both
potentially higher costs arising from the obligation to provide notice and
severance pay and future recruitment costs if lay-offs resulting in a
dispersion of the workforce were instituted.
Despite the lack of enthusiasm for schemes of this nature, the federal
government began considering the possibility of work sharing as an
alternative to temporary lay-off in the mid-1970s. As a result of the
amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act in 1976 and 1977, a
pilot project was introduced. 81 Under experimental agreements, employers
and employees facing short-term employment reduction agreed that all
employees would work between one and three days less per week and
receive unemployment insurance to offset wage loss. The scheme was
intended to sustain employment in periods of short-term, adverse economic
conditions with the object of maintaining a stable labour force by
preventing the erosion of worker skills and a permanent dispersion of
the workforce.
Work sharing using unemployment insurance funds was designed
as an alternative to unemployment insurance, and, although based on
81 UnemploymentlnsuranceAc4 1971,S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s.37; cf UnemploymentInsurance

Regulations, SOR/78-710, ss 90-99.
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the uI benefit structure, a number of the entitlement provisions were
amended. Most significantly, the normal seven-day waiting period was
not applied. Moreover, receipt of work-sharing benefits did not reduce
the regular unemployment insurance entitlement of the participants. Under
the scheme, payment of partial unemployment compensation depended
on the employer establishing that at least 20 percent of the employer's
workforce would have their hours of work reduced by at least 20 percent
for four weeks. In 1982, $30 million were committed to the project.
Federal government commitment was subsequently increased to $190
million, with a further $150 million allotted for 1983. By the beginning
of 1983, it was estimated that approximately 209,000 workers across
Canada had taken part in the scheme and that 89,430 lay-offs had been
avoided. 82
In evaluating the success of work-sharing schemes much depends
upon the criteria used. While work sharing may appear to offer a more
equitable response to reduced labour demand than lay-offs, the federal
government scheme was not assessed very favourably in the Report of
the Task Force on Unemployment Insurance. 83 The Task Force concluded
that while the theoretical aims of the work-sharing projects may have
been justified, the programme did not accomplish what was expected.
It was felt that the scheme was simply another way of paying regular
unemployment insurance benefits since, in most instances examined, there
was little risk that the firm's workforce would have dispersed had there
actually been a lay-off. The Task Force found that the payout for worksharing arrangements was about two and a half times the normal benefit
payment rate and that on average an employee's working time was reduced
by 30 percent while gross earnings were reduced by only 7 percent.
The Report states, "[t]he conclusions from the evaluations are distinctly
negative on a cost-benefit basis for financing work-sharing agreements
through Unemployment Insurance." 84
While arriving at the conclusion that payout increased by two and
a half times the normal benefit rate, calculations failed to include additional
costs incurred through the provision of other social services to the
unemployed. Empirical evidence has shown that unemployment is invariably accompanied by an increase in the cost of community assistance

82 D. Dodge, Address (Conference on Canadian Labour Markets in the 1980s, Queen's
University, Kingston, 25 February 1983) [unpublished].
83 Task Force on Unemployment Insurance in the 1980s, supra, note 51.
84 Ibid at 82.
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support measures.85 If it were possible to assess these additional costs
and include them on the unemployment insurance costs side of the
equation, the difference between work-sharing costs and expenditure
incurred as a result of lay-offs might not be as marked.
Using a purely cost-benefit analysis raises a more fundamental issue.
In many cases, job loss resulting in economic hardship is accompanied
by numerous psychological, physiological and social problems, not merely
for the individual worker concerned, but for his immediate family and
friends also. The social costs of unemployment are rarely considered
in assessing the effectiveness of work sharing and accompanying support
programmes. Undeniably there are large social costs associated with job
loss, and these should be considered in any evaluation of a work-sharing
scheme aimed at avoiding lay-offs. The problem in the past has been
that these costs are neither easily identifiable nor easily reduced to a
purely dollars and cents calculation.
Work-sharing schemes are appropriate where decreases in production
levels are merely temporary, arising, for example, from a cyclical downturn
in market demand. While protection may be provided against short-term
employment reduction, there is a danger that over-reliance might be
placed on schemes of this nature. Work sharing is a transitional measure
and is not appropriate in cases of long-term structural unemployment.
It may 'mask' long-term business inefficiency and prop-up enterprises
that are not economically viable. To this extent the effect will be purely
cosmetic and may even impede necessary labour market adjustment to
structural unemployment problems. 86
Nevertheless, if an effective screening process was devised to ensure
the long-term profitability of individual industrial concerns, work sharing
as a means of avoiding recurring lay-offs has a role to play. Until the
recession, little incentive for partial employment as a short-term solution
had been provided. Increasingly, however, the pilot project adopted began
to attract considerable interest. Perhaps the greatest stumbling-block
preventing widespread acceptance of the concept were the attitudes of
the two major participants, employers and trade unions.87
85 Metropolitan Toronto, Social Planning Council, Layoffs and Unemployment (Working Paper
No. 2), and Social Impacts of Job Loss (Working Paper No. 3) in Work for Tomorrow: Working
Papersfor Full Employment (Toronto: July, 1980).
86 See the Task Force on Unemployment Insurance in the 1980s, supra, note 51 at 82. Cf
E. Yemin, Workforce Reductions in Undertakings (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1982) at
46, where Professor Adell argues that work sharing may become "an artificial impediment to
the demise of economically unsound enterprises."
87 The United Auto Workers Union was one of the few major trade unions to give approval
to the program. In April 1982, 66 percent of plants on work sharing were non-union, while 34
percent were covered by union agreements: W. List, "Pay Cuts 4-Day Week: Worksharing Helps
Avoid Layoffs" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 May 1982) 15.
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B. Early Retirement
In Canada, the number of older employees in the labour force and
the participation rate among their members has been declining gradually
over the last two decades. 88 Given this fact, the question to be considered
is whether the retirement of older employees before normal retirement
age might be used in a redundancy situation as a form of induced attrition
to prevent younger workers being laid off. Since empirical evidence has
shown that older employees are less mobile and less easily trained for
new jobs,89 the possibility of early retirement might appear to offer at
least a partial solution to the problems created by a growing labour
force and declining employment levels.
Table 8
Percentage Distribution Figures for the Labour Force
Over the Last Twenty Years

1961

1971

1975

1982 (Oct.)

Both Sexes

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

15-19
20-24
25-44
45-64
65 and over

10.4
12.0
45.8
29.0
3.5

10.4
15.7
42.5
29.2
2.2

11.6
15.6
44.1
26.6
2.0

8.7
15.3
49.3
25.0
1.6

Source: Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Cat. 71-001.

Table 9
Participation Rate by Age (Canada)
October 1962 (Both Sexes)
14-19 years 65 and over -

33.4 percent
16.2 percent

October 1982 (Both Sexes)
15-19 years - 48.8 percent
65 and over - 8.4 percent

Source: Statistics Canada, The Labour Force Cat. 71-001

There were, however, a number of problems associated with retirement in the early 1980s, not the least of which was the issue of
income protection. Deficiencies in existing pensions legislationo and, in
particular, the inadequacies of private employer-sponsored retirement
income systems were the major drawback.91
88 See Tables 8 and 9.

89 See Portis & Suys, supra, note 63.
90 Canada, Report of the Task Force on Retirement Incomes Policy: The Retirement Income
System in Canada- Problems and Alternatives for Reform, vol. 1 (Hull, Que.: Supply & Services
Canada, 1980). Cf Report of the Royal Commision on the Status of Pensions in Ontario (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1980) (Chair. DJ. Haley).
91 P. Kumar & A.M.M. Smith, Pension Reform in Canada:A Review of the Issues and Options
(Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1981).
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Under much of the existing pensions legislation in Canada, to acquire
a non-forfeitable right to pension benefits arising from employer contributions, an employee must be over forty-five and have worked for
the same employer for ten years.92 This was very often the minimum
vesting requirement, although individual pension plans negotiated under
the collective bargaining system may have contained more liberal vesting
provisions. Attempts to have the courts extend vesting rights beyond the
statutory minimum were not successful. A number of decisions in Ontario
show that the judiciary was not prepared to strain the wording of
regulations or of a pension plan document to grant vested pensions before
entitlement arose where there was no statutory or contractual power
93
to do so, however equitable or desirable this may have appeared.
A second problem was the issue of portability of accrued pension
credit from one pension plan to another. Normally pension plans did
not provide that an employee's pensionable service with a prior employer
would be included in calculating the pension to be provided by a
subsequent employer. Thus, where an employee left or was retired from
one job, normally his accumulated pension entitlement was not transferrable unless there was a reciprocal agreement among employers to
recognize credits.
Table 10
Profile of Pension Plans in Canada, 1980 (%)

1978

1980

5.6
0.6

5.3
0.6

92.2
0.3
0.8
0.4

92.6
0.2
0.7
0.5

Provision

97.7

97.9

At Employee's Option

12.4

14.2

At Employer's Option
By Mutual Consent
Other

5.6
78.1
1.6

4.9
77.2
1.4

2.3

2.1

Normal Retirement Age
60
61-64

65
66-69
70
(Other)
Early Retirement

No Provision

Source: Statistics Canada, Pension Plans in Canada, Cat. 74-001.

92 See, for example, Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, s. 20.
93 Re GrantBus Lines Ltd andPension Commission of Ontario (1980), 30 O.R. (2d) 180 (H.C.);
cf Nero v. Rygus (1981), 33 O.R (2d) 445 (H.C.).
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Another problem was that vested pension contributions were often
locked in and had to be used to purchase a deferred annuity payable
upon retirement. The annuity was purchased from an insurance company
and the interest payable may have been significantly less than current
market rates. Where pension plans were not indexed to the rate of inflation,
when entitlement arose, the actual value of the interest vested may have
94
declined considerably.
The lack of a cohesive retirement income system in Canada
considerably discouraged early retirement policies. Most private pension
plans did provide early retirement options on an actuarily reduced basis.95
However, unless the employees covered by the plan had made sufficient
prior arrangements to maintain an adequate level of income after
retirement, actuarial reductions in pension entitlement would have discouraged early retirement. It is unlikely that many of those employees
most vulnerable to large-scale lay-offs would have had sufficient surplus
capital to enable them to participate in private investment schemes of
this nature. While severance payments may have compensated to a certain
extent for reductions in pension entitlement, they cannot possibly have
provided other than short-term financial support.
A number of other factors militated against early retirement policies,
especially against mandatory early retirement. Recent jurisprudence
suggests that compulsory retirement below the established retirement age
may be discrimination on the basis of age and a breach of human rights
legislation. In OntarioHumanRights Commission v. Borough ofEtobicoke,96
the Supreme Court of Canada held that mandatory retirement at age
sixty constituted a breach of the existing Ontario legislation. The Supreme
Court emphasized that the Human Rights Code is, "a public statute and
constitutes public policy in Ontario" and that a person may not contract
out of his rights guaranteed thereunder, either individually or through
a collective agreement. 97
In Ontario and Quebec, one factor in particular may slow the
withdrawal of older workers from the labour force in a number of industrial
sectors. Recent studies on shortages of highly skilled workers in construction, manufacturing, and tool and die operating indicate that an aging,
skilled labour force, coupled with the decline in the supply of skilled
94 Both the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans provide for full and immediate vesting and
complete inflation adjustment.
95 See Table 10.
96 [1982] 1 S.C.R. 202.
97 Cf Newport v. Government of Manitoba (1981), 12 Man. R. (2d) 443 (Q.B.); Parkinson

v. Health Sciences Centre (1982), 13 Man. FL (2d) 233 (C.A.).
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immigrant workers, will increase the pressure to retain the skills of older
employees. Consequently, rather than early retirement, retention of
employees beyond age sixty-five may be necessary. If this is the case,
the apparent conflict between the need to provide added employment
opportunities for younger workers and the need to retain the skills of
older workers may be resolved by adopting more flexible work arrangements providing perhaps longer vacations graduated by age, part-time
work schedules, and a gradual reduction of working hours for persons
over sixty-five.
Since early retirement will usually be accompanied by a drop in
income, it would seem likely that only those employees who are
particularly dissatisfied with their work will find the option attractive.
If this is the case, the impact of early retirement as a form of induced
attrition and a means of preventing lay-offs among younger members
of the workforce may be fairly minimal. Nevertheless, given the magnitude
of the lay-off problem in Canada, the opportunities that an early retirement
policy provides are worth pursuing.
The impact of both work sharing and early retirement policies as
alternative responses to lay-offs could have been increased by a number
of other possible approaches. A restriction or elimination of overtime
and the option of recalling or reducing the amount of work that had
been sub-contracted out might have increased the demand for labour
during normal working hours. Natural attrition, accompanied by a
recruitment freeze, could also have provided added job opportunities for
existing members of the workforce, enabling employees who were facing
lay-off to be redeployed in the existing enterprise structure. This might
have required increased emphasis on short-term training to meet the
requirements of available job vacancies and also an easing of negotiated
work rules.
While alternatives to lay-off might appear to be relatively attractive
concepts, many of these seem to prejudice the interests of older employees
wishing to retain their jobs. Consequently, the success or failure of schemes
aimed at avoiding lay-offs may depend upon the importance of seniority
systems in unionized firms, the number of older workers employed, and
whether a particular firm is in a position to make early retirement a
more attractive proposition through larger severance payments and other
retirement income supplements.
Increasingly, it must be recognized that there are only a limited
number of jobs available. The choice will, therefore, have to be made
between giving priority on the basis of length of service alone or taking
into account the wider social implications arising from the greater financial
burdens of younger workers. The choice may not be an easy one to
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make, but if more adequate provision for income maintenance upon
retirement is provided, social equity surely dictates the appropriate course
to be followed.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In Canada, redundancies and lay-offs have been largely accepted
by employers, employees, and government as a necessary, if undesirable,
consequence of an industrial society. As a result, the legal and institutional
protections adopted have used economic buffers and measures that are
designed to improve re-employment opportunities to alleviate the adverse
effects of job loss. The severity of the economic recession from 1981-83
led to a large increase in redundancies and lay-offs, raising considerable
debate over the adequacy of those protections. One must ask if the
available legal and institutional protections were adequate or if more
could have been done to help the redundant worker in Canada.
Diagnosis of the problem and prescription of a remedy may depend
upon the political and economic policies one adopts. Critics of the existing
scheme might argue than an emphasis on lay-offs provides a positive
endorsement of the commodity view of labour. From this standpoint
it might also be argued that deference to the norms of economic rationality
and to the assumed 'industrial logic' justifying lay-offs may have obscured
the nature and consequences of the problem. Taking this line of argument,
it can be asked whether layoffs in Canada were simply an unfortunate
by-product of the efficient operation of the free enterprise system and
job loss a purely personal misfortune for individuals affected during the
survey period.
In attempting to address that argument, it is important to point out
that the vast majority of redundancies and lay-offs which occurred at
that time were necessary to either stave off complete economic collapse
or to reorganize existing plant processes in order to remain competitive
in domestic world markets. Large sectors of Canadian industry were
undergoing structural changes which had serious adverse consequences
for many workers. It must be clearly emphasized, however, that the longterm costs of non-adjustment for industry, workers, and the Canadian
economy in general would almost certainly far outweigh the costs of
adjustment. Support for this argument is found in the recent reversal
of the approach taken by many western European countries.
In response to rising unemployment in 1974-75, caused by the
dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973, emphasis in Western Europe
was placed on job maintenance measures through employment subsidies,
short-time work subsidies, inventory build-ups, and direct government
financial support for specific industrial sectors. The various governments
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believed that the period required for economic adjustment would be
relatively short. This was not in fact the case. As low growth and high
unemployment continued, it became increasingly apparent that job
maintenance measures were impeding necessary labour market adjustments and had to be phased out. In many of these countries, emphasis
is now placed on measures designed to reduce the supply of labour to
declining sectors of industry and to redistribute available employment.
Considerable emphasis has been placed on early retirement, work sharing,
and subsidized short-time work schemes. This approach has been supported by a significant expansion in publicly funded re-employment and
retraining schemes designed to generate new employment opportunities
for those employees who have lost their jobs.
In a number of these countries, the recent emphasis placed on
measures designed to promote labour market adjustment has not been
well received. This is especially true in those sectors of industry where
job maintenance efforts have been most intensive. Many of the problems
that have arisen may be directly attributed to governments because, for
political reasons, they promoted a retention of the existing workforce
rather than making the needed adjustments.
In Canada, emphasis has been placed on adjustment to economic
and technological change. While undoubtedly this has been the more
appropriate course of action, until very recently the costs of adjustment,
both economic and social, were borne primarily by workers who had
lost their jobs. By the beginning of the present decade, however, it
increasingly appeared that the problems faced by redundant workers were
being recognized. Much of the debate at that time centred on whether
greater protection could be provided and how the external social and
economic costs of labour displacement could be distributed more
equitably.
In several Canadian jurisdictions, a distinction is drawn between
lay-offs for economic reasons, where the employer can no longer afford
to maintain full productive capacity, and lay-offs arising from production
rationalization, wherejob loss arises as a result of technological innovation.
In those jurisdictions, 98 legislation has been introduced requiring a reopening of the collective agreement for bargaining where a substantial
number of employees are likely to be affected by technological change.
The re-opener clause is intended to facilitate consultation and negotiation
designed to avoid lay-offs and to mitigate the adverse effects of job
98 Labour Relations Ac4 1972, S.M. 1972, c. 75, ss 72-75; Labour Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.
212, ss 74-78; Canada Labour Code, RS.C. 1970, c. L-1, ss 149-53 as am. S.C. 1972, c. 18,

s. 1; Trade Union Ac4 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 137, s. 42.
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loss by requiring the employer to participate in re-employment efforts
and provide compensation to employees who have lost their jobs.
Because of the short-term focus of the vast majority of collective
agreements in Canada, it may have been difficult, or indeed deemed
unnecessary, to bargain for the inclusion of a reopener clause.
However, the inclusion of a legal obligation to negotiate in cases
where lay-offs are directly attributable to technological developments
may be justified on a number of grounds. Both economically and socially
it is important to reduce the apprehension concerning possible job loss
that exists among workers at present. Economically it makes sense to
do so in order to prevent the ingrained resistance to any form of industrial
conversion that arises from such apprehension. Socially it is a matter
of urgent necessity. It is unacceptable for those who expect to benefit
from change to require a minority of workers to bear the burden of
that change through lay-offs. A purely utilitarian approach to the question
of labour displacement is no longer appropriate. Nor is the pursuit of
economic efficiency the sole social policy that society should require
from corporations. Employers have definite and definable social obligations to their employees. The cost of reasonable proposals to protect
employees from the adverse consequences of industrial change is a proper
charge against employers' benefits and savings. If prior consultation on
proposed technological change had been made mandatory, an element
of security in employment greater than that which exists at present could
have been provided.
Where the employer stands to gain a substantial financial saving
by installing new technology, it may be possible to extract concessions
regarding lay-offs and redundancies. Where production rationalization
is necessary merely to stay in business, or where labour displacement
is due to other economic difficulties, a number of different considerations
are raised. Bargaining in these cases may exacerbate the problems.
In Canada, available data indicate the vast majority of lay-offs which
occurred from 1981 to 1983 arose as a direct result of conditions created
by the economic recession. As has been seen, the response to the problem
was essentially reactionary and was characterized by protections coming
into effect after redundancies and layoffs occurred. The question raised
is whether greater security in employment could have been provided
by imposing more stringent restrictions on the employer's right to lay
off in those circumstances.
It has been suggested that the more onerous restrictions imposed
on the employer's right to lay off in other jurisdictions should be adopted
in Canada. Comparisons may be drawn with many western European
countries which impose a legal duty to consult employee representatives
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prior to lay-offs. Consultation in certain circumstances can be useful
as a means of reducing the number of lay-offs necessary and as a means
of mitigating their adverse effects. It may be especially useful where
the immediate problems necessitating lay-offs are confined to a particular
firm or a particular branch of industry. In a general economic recession,
however, this is not normally the case, and consultation in these circumstances may provide little more than a procedural safeguard when
selection of those to be made redundant is being made.
In a number of European countries, prior government authorization
for lay-offs is required. In Canada, legal restrictions of this nature are
largely incompatible with a private enterprise system promoting as it
does, decentralized control, minimum government interference, and
market adjustment. Reform of this nature would likely have been met
with considerable opposition from the private sector. Notwithstanding
this fact, it is questionable whether a requirement of this nature is
particularly useful. In those western European countries where justification
for lay-offs is required, government departments have not been in a
position to discuss issues of business economics put forward by employers.
In the vast majority of cases, if the employer can show that the reasons
for lay-off are real, the government will not intervene.99
The growing concern for job security in Canada created a basic
conflict between employee interests and the employer's right to manage.
How might this apparent inherent conflict be resolved? On the one hand,
to provide no protection to an employee's right to employment is a denial
of the social values the law is designed to protect. On the other hand,
to provide an absolute and entrenched right not to be removed from
employment would likely promote stagnation in the economy through
an inability to adapt to changing economic conditions and technological
developments.
If we accept that the fundamental purpose of contract law is to
protect expectations reasonably created by the contract and that job
security is a reasonable and rational expectation, we must also realize
that full effect cannot always be given to reasonable expectations. In
certain circumstances their achievement may have to be subordinated
to some other value. Putting the employee's desire for security in
employment on the one side of the scale, and the harsh facts of economics
and innovation on the other, the latter must prevail. In order to retain
99 Topic II Termination of Employment on the Initiative of the Employer and Income Security
of the Worker Concerned (Information submitted to the Tenth International Congress of the
International Society for Labour Law and Social Security, Washington, D.C., 7-10 September 1982).
Cf A. Adlercreutz & B. Flodgren, "Termination of Employment on the Initiative of the Employer
and Income Security of the Worker Concerned," Swedish National Report.
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the benefits of a dynamic industrial society redundancy must be cause
for termination.
This is not to say that the right to an element of job security should
be discarded. The goal of protecting reasonable expectations must remain
lest the expectations become abstract concepts with neither meaning nor
function. Redundancy should be cause for termination, but only after
all possible alternatives have been examined by the parties, and both
an adequate level of income support and opportunities for re-employment
are provided for the employees.
Job loss will inevitably continue to arise as a result of the pervasive
changes currently experienced by industrialized countries where vulnerable branches of industry continue to suffer from increased foreign
competition. Both the large and small-scale lay-offs that occurred in
recent years are, therefore, likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
To combat the problems created by lay-offs, employers and employees must recognize common responsibilities that transcend the law.
It is unlikely that legal intervention alorle would have proved particularly
effective in 1981-83. As has been seen, there are limitations on the
role that the law can play in ensuring that action will be taken to avoid
lay-offs and resulting hardship. Alleviation of the problems created by
lay-offs requires a radical change in traditional employer-employee
attitudes to the whole issue oflabour displacement. Increasingly, the parties
themselves must recognize that lay-off and redundancy is a recurring
phenomenon. Because of foreign competition, technological innovation,
changes in patterns of consumption, changes in domestic and world
markets, resource repletion, and cyclical economic trends, job loss is
inevitable.
Employers, employees, and government must all place added emphasis on developing medium and long-term planning to aid employees
affected by significant changes in business and industry. In Canada, the
adjustment processes that have been adopted have been hindered in recent
years by prevailing economic policies. It is beyond argument that the
priority given to the fight against inflation has severely constrained the
impact of the labour market policies that have been implemented. We
should therefore be wary of prejudging the effectiveness of these policies
in terms of their apparent failure to bring down unemployment levels.
This is not to say that the need for considerable improvements in
the range of adjustment measures available should be over-looked. In
the final analysis, effective redundancy management cannot be brought
about by legal intervention alone. It will require the co-ordination of
both short and long-term policies and programmes at all levels to avoid
or reduce the adverse effects of job loss. If greater priority is given to
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these problems, the danger that must be avoided is the indiscriminate
adoption of a wide range of potentially distortionary and ineffective
programmes. Increased public expenditure to alleviate some of the existing
problems must be directed towards cost-effective remedies. Perhaps the
major stumbling-block to implementing effective strategies are the
political difficulties involved in minimizing or ignoring job maintenance
demands in a period of high unemployment, and in trying to simultaneously
fulfil economic and social goals. Resolution of the problems that this
creates will provide a significant challenge for policy-makers in the years
ahead.

